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1. The late Billy Preston made famous the song Will It Go Round in Circles. One of
the verses is:
I've got a lil' story ain't got no moral
Let the bad guy win every once in a while...
Chorus:
Will it go round in circles?
Will it fly high like a bird up in the sky?
BILLY PRESTON, Will it Go Round in Circles, on Music is My LIFE (A&M Records,
Inc. 1972).
"Goin' round in circles" is a reference to the circular argument that subprime
borrowers are choosing the non-traditional mortgage products found in the mar-
ket as informed market participants or rational buyers and therefore shoulder
the total responsibility for their inability to repay the loans. This neoclassical
economic argument obscures the fact that many products in today's consumer
mortgage market are designed to fail, which is inapposite to the consumer's ex-
pectation to receive an affordable and sustainable mortgage loan product.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Home ownership is an American dream. Yet, America faces a cri-
sis in the residential housing market that threatens that dream for
many. Approximately 2.2 million borrowers with home equity totaling
$164 billion or almost one-third of outstanding subprime mortgages
will face foreclosure. 2 An even greater number of subprime home
2. The Center for Responsible Lending ("CRL") has estimated the percentage of
foreclosures based on performance of the home mortgage loans over the life of the
loan. ELLEN SCHLOEMER, WEI Li, KEITH ERNST, AND KATHLEEN KEEST, CTR. FOR
RESPONSIBLE LENDING, LOSING GROUND: FORECLOSURES IN THE SUBPRIME MARKET
AND THEIR COST TO HOMEOWNERS 15-16 (2006) (hereinafter LOSING GROUND),
available at http://www.responsiblelending.org/pdfs/FC-paper-12-19-new-cover-1.
pdf.
These numbers are based on the fourth quarter of 2006. According to the
Mortgage Bankers Association ("MBA"), this number represents an increase of 14
basis points from the third quarter of 2006. Press Release, The Mortgage Bank-
ers Ass'n, Delinquencies and Foreclosures Increase in Latest MBA National De-
[Vol. 86:737
2008] THE NEED FOR UNIFORM BROKER REGULATION 739
loans, 16.31% are delinquent, with 2.12% beginning foreclosure in the
third quarter of 2007 and 6.89% of the delinquent subprime loans in
foreclosure at the end of the third quarter.3 Loans totaling $164 bil-
lion are delinquent in monthly mortgage payments. 4 Ironically, these
rising delinquency and foreclosure rates are due in large part to
greater access to credit for homebuyers through the subprime lending
market.5 Though subprime lending 6 has filled a credit gap and ad-
dressed the problem of access to mortgage financing by creating a new
linquency Survey (Dec. 6, 2007), available at http://www.mortgagebankers.org/
NewsandMedia/PressCenter/58758.htm. See also, Joint Econ. Comm., The Sub-
prime Lending Crisis: The Economic Impact on Wealth, Property Values and Tax
Revenues, and How We Got Here, S. Rep. No. 110-251 at 71-78 (2007) (estimat-
ing the number of foreclosures for the third quarter of 2007 through the end of
2009 to be around 1.66 million, and the related property loss around $106 billion).
3. In the mortgage market, serious delinquencies are around 1% and foreclosures
0.2%. In the prime market, the delinquency rate is usually about .2%. Eight
percent of subprime loans were seriously delinquent, meaning 90 days or more,
during 2006 and the first half of 2007 as compared with 6% in 2005 and the first
half of 2006. The foreclosure rate has climbed from 1.5% at the end of 2005 to
2.5%. During 2000-2002, serious delinquencies were about 12%, and foreclosures
ranged from 2.5% to 3%. Press Release, The Mortgage Bankers Ass'n, Delinquen-
cies and Foreclosures Increase in Latest MBA National Delinquency Survey (Dec.
6, 2007), available at http://www.mortgagebankers.org/NewsandMedia/Press
Center/58758.htm. See also, Joint Econ. Comm., The Subprime Lending Crisis:
The Economic Impact on Wealth, Property Values and Tax Revenues, and How
We Got Here, S. Rep. No. 110-251 at 71-78 (2007) (estimating the number of
foreclosures for the third quarter of 2007 through the end of 2009 to be around
1.66 million, and the related property loss around $106 billion.) The most recent
estimate projected $3 million in defaults this year and next leading ultimately to
2 million in lost homes. The Growing Mortgage Foreclosure Crisis: Identifying
Solutions and Dispelling Myths, Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Administra-
tive and Commercial Law, 110th Cong. 52 (2008) (statement of Mark M. Zandi,
Ph.D., Chief Economist, Moody's Economy.com, Inc.).
4. Numbers are based on the fourth quarter of 2006 on a seasonally adjusted basis.
This number is up 28 basis points from the third quarter, and up 25 basis points
from one year ago, according to MBA's National Delinquency Survey. Press Re-
lease, The Mortgage Bankers Ass'n, Delinquencies and Foreclosures Increase in
Latest MBA National Delinquency Survey (Mar. 13, 2007), available at http://
www.mortgagebankers.org/NewsandMedia/PressCenter/50974.htm.
In July 2007, Standard & Poor's changed the ratings on $10 billion of debt
from structured investment vehicles sponsored by Cheyne Capital Management
from AAA to CCC. Eric Dash, S.& P. Cuts British Firm's Debt Rating, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 29, 2007, at C1.
5. The emergence of a subprime market for residential mortgages has closed a
credit gap by making home ownership more affordable. In 1995, the subprime
home loan market was valued at $65 million. 1 INSIDE MORTGAGE FINANCE PUB-
LICATIONS, THE 2007 MORTGAGE MARKET STATISTICAL ANNUAL 222 (2007). By
2006, the total volume of subprime loans was $600 billion, down from $665 billion
in 2005. Today, subprime mortgage originations constitute 23% of all mortgages.
Id. at 209. The subprime market has also filled a market gap by allowing credit-
impaired homeowners to borrow against the equity in their homes to meet a vari-
ety of needs. Cassandra Jones Havard, Democratizing Credit: Examining the
Structural Inequities of Subprime Lending, 56 SYRACUSE L. REV. 233, 259 (2005).
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market for home ownership, it has created more opportunities for abu-
sive lending.7 Borrowers have entered into financially detrimental
and imprudent loans, often without being fully aware of or under-
standing the substance of their commitments. These often predatory
loans are characterized by product terms and features such as inter-
est-only, high loan-to-value ("LTV") ratios, low start rates, and adjust-
able rates. Borrowers also have entered into mortgage agreements
with high debt-to-income ratios; loans in which the monthly payment
was large relative to the borrower's income.8 Many of these borrowers
received loans without providing supporting documentation of their
income or even providing a down payment. 9 The rising number of
subprime mortgage foreclosures threatens to undermine the signifi-
cant home ownership gains made over the past two decades.1O
Some argue that the current crisis merely represents market fail-
ure.'" The massive defaults in the subprime mortgage markets, the
explanation goes, demonstrate that credit-impaired borrower markets
are risky and have no place in the usually stable mortgage sector. This
explanation supports the imperative that private, free market policies
are the best solution to address both imperfections and inequality in
the market and that the current subprime mortgage crisis is a neces-
6. Virtually all predatory mortgages have subprime characteristics, though the vast
majority of subprime mortgages cannot be characterized as predatory. See Kath-
leen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets: The Law and Eco-
nomics of Predatory Lending, 80 TEx. L. REV. 1255, 1260, n.6 (2002).
7. "Because of innovations in the prime and subprime mortgage market, nearly 9
million new homeowners are now able to live in their own homes, improve their
neighborhoods, and use their homes to build wealth." Edward M. Gramlich,
Govenor, Fed. Reserve Bd., Address at the Financial Services Roundtable Annual
Housing Policy Meeting, Chicago, Illinois (May 21, 2004).
8. A Center for Responsible Lending Study projects that 1 out of 5 subprime borrow-
ers will default on their mortgages over a 10 year period. SCHLOEMER, ET AL,
supra note 2, at 19.
9. There is no consensus on what constitutes predatory lending, but there are three
common features, loan flipping, high fees, and pricing. David J. Weiner, Assignee
Liability in State Predatory Lending Laws: How Uncapped Punitive Damages
Threaten the Secondary Mortgage Market, 55 EMORY L.J. 535, 546-49 (2006).
10. See generally Heather McCulloch, Promoting Economic Security for Working
Families: State Asset-Building Initiatives, 7 Housing Facts and Findings, Vol. 2,
at 3 (2005), available at http://www.fanniemaefoundation.org/programs/hff/pdf/
HFF v7i2.pdf; GWENDOLYN WRIGHT, BUILDING THE DREAM: A SOCILL HISTORY OF
HOUSING IN THE UNITED STATES (1981).
11. Subprime Lending: Defining the Market and Its Customers: J. Hearing Before the
H. Subcomm. On housing and Community Opportunity and the H. Comm. on Fi-
nancial Services, 108th Cong. 73-76, 267-72 (statement of Anthony Yeazer, Pro-
fessor of Economics, George Washigton University). Cf. Athanasios Orphandies
& John C. Williams, Robust Monetary Policy with Imperfect Knowledge (Fed.
Res. Board Working Paper No. 33-2007), available at http://www.federalreserve.
gov/pubs/feds/2007/200733/200733pap.pdf.
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sary market correction. 12 Irrational borrowers, the line of reasoning
continues, who accepted, rather than rejected, onerous loan terms
must now bear the consequences of their actions.
To the contrary, the current crisis in the subprime mortgage sector
is due to a market that has failed borrowers. 13 Mortgage market ex-
pansion should be seen as a means to address economic inequality
with the expectation that the market operates in a manner consistent
with borrower expectations.14 Market-driven innovations, such as the
subprime lending market, must be scrutinized for inequality in the
treatment of vulnerable borrowers. Such inequality must be rooted
out and rejected to ensure that the financially under-served receive
their fair share of economic growth. In the context of subprime lend-
ing, that fair share is measured against policies and practices that
cause marginalization and subordination. 15 Quite simply, this theory
advocates that subprime lending policies must support mortgage
sustainability.16
Mortgage sustainability, or affordable mortgage financing, is pres-
ently impacted negatively by the securitization of subprime loans.
Securitization of loans is an underappreciated factor that paralleled
the evolution of the subprime mortgage market.17 Securitization has
increased the availability of subprime mortgage credit and spawned a
more significant function for mortgage brokers in the lending
process. 18
12. See infra Part II.B.3 for a discussion of how subprime lending also addresses is-
sues of inequality. For a discussion of the effects of privatization in another con-
text see Michele Estrin Gilman, Legal Accountability in an Era of Privatized
Welfare, 89 CAL. L. REV. 569 (2001).
13. See generally Douglas G. Baird, Discharge, Waiver, and the Behavioral Undercur-
rents of Debtor-Creditor Law, 73 U. Cm LAW. REV. 16, (2007); Ian Ayres, Menus
Matter, 73 U. CHI LAW. REV. 1 (2007).
14. Affordable housing measures evaluate whether a buyer can qualify for the loan
and afford the initial down payment as well as whether the homeowner is able to
sustain the mortgage payments over time. Predatory loans conflict with housing
affordability objectives by creating a pricing structure that which leads to the
buyer defaulting on the loan.
15. See Havard, Democratizing Credit, supra note 5, at 269-75.
16. See Mark Wiranowski, Joint Center for Housing Studies of Harvard University,
Neighborhood Reinvestment Corporation, Sustaining Home Ownership Through
Education and Counseling, Oct. 2003, http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/
homeownership/w03-7_wiranowski.pdf.
17. The consolidation of the banking industry has resulted in the transformation of
many sectors of the financial services industry. See generally Arthur E. Wil-
marth, Jr., The Transformation of the U.S. Financial Services Industry,
1975-2000: Competition, Consolidation, and Increased Risks, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV.
215, 241-49 (2002) (arguing that bank profitability is declining as a result of com-
petition and consolidation).
18. As used in this Article, mortgage brokers means mortgage brokers, bankers, and
lenders, all of which would be subject to the proposed regulations. See discussion
infra Part III.
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Mortgage brokers perform many of the tasks involved in loan origi-
nation.19 They are also instrumental in identifying a broader market
of lenders for potential borrowers. A mortgage broker's specialized
knowledge and access to multiple lending sources is particularly help-
ful to borrowers who have been traditionally excluded from the mar-
ket due to credit risks. When mortgage brokers function effectively
and legitimately, they recommend loans with reasonable terms that
are suited to the borrower's financial circumstance. But mortgage
brokers' actions go largely unchecked and consequently some brokers
recommend deceptive, unreasonable loan terms and unnecessarily
high interest rates.20 The combination of the effects of unscrupulous
mortgage brokers and subprime lending has failed to fully protect
credit-impaired borrowers, resulting in higher delinquency and fore-
closure rates. Seventy percent of the now delinquent subprime loans
were made by mortgage brokers. 2 1 Thus, the role of the mortgage bro-
ker in the subprime market requires critical examination.
The primary regulation of mortgage brokers currently resides with
the states, with some states having little or no regulation.2 2 Federal
regulation of mortgage brokers offers an answer to the abuse that has
accompanied the expanded access to subprime loans. This Article ar-
gues that the mortgage broker industry requires strengthened joint
federal and state legislation because an unregulated industry poses a
significant economic risk by confusing the interrelated issues of access
with quality.
Part I of this Article discusses the structural framework of the
mortgage broker industry. It describes the use and development of
19. See generally Lloyd T. Wilson, Jr., A Taxonomic Analysis of Mortgage Broker Li-
censing Statutes: Developing a Programmatic Response to Predatory Lending, 36
N.M. L. REV. 297 (2006) (comparing and contrasting the the licensing statutes in
four different states).
Mortgage brokers participate in more than 68% of home loans originations.
The remaining 32% is retail done through the lenders retail channel, which
means the lender does not go through a broker. See Licensing and Registration in
the Mortgage Industry: Licensing and Registration in the Mortgage Industry:
Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Housing and Community Opportunity of the
Comm. on Fin. Servs., 109th Cong. 70 (2005) (hereinafter Licensing and Registra-
tion Hearing) (statement of Joseph L. Falk, President, Irian Mortgage Servs., on
behalf of the Nat'l Ass'n of Mortgage Brokers). The National Association of Mort-
gage Brokers estimates that "mortgage broker operations across the nation origi-
nate 65% of all residential loans in the U.S." Id.
20. See generally Lawrence Hansen, In Brokers We Trust-Mortgage Licensing Stat-
utes Address Predatory Lending Regulation, 14 J. Affordable Housing & Commu-
nity. Dev. 332 (2005); Lloyd T. Wilson, Jr., Effecting Responsibility in the
Mortgage Broker-Borrower Relationship: A Role for Agency Principles in Preda-
tory Lending Regulation, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 1471 (2005).
21. Georgette C. Poindexter, Subordinated Rolling Equity: Analyzing Real Estate
Loan Default in the Era of Securitization, 50 EMORY L.J. 519, 525 (2001).
22. See discussion infra Part II.
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mortgage brokers and how some loans they endorse involve poten-
tially reckless lending practices. These are loans designed to disad-
vantage borrowers because they are designed to fail. It then explains
how these practices support abusive, predatory lending. Part I con-
cludes by arguing that the societal costs of home ownership loss for a
particularly vulnerable segment of borrowers justify a more compre-
hensive federal program.
Part II presents the corrective framework for the mortgage broker
industry. Beginning with a discussion of the federalism debate in
banking law, it briefly reviews the constitutional feasibility of any fed-
eral regulation in this area. It argues that the current legal frame-
work is inadequate to address the potential economic risks that
mortgage brokers impose. The private securitization of subprime
loans creates a moral hazard thereby justifying the need for the impo-
sition of a fiduciary duty.
Finally, Part III addresses why a federal approach is needed and
explains what such a regime should address. Recognizing that all bor-
rowers, not just subprime borrowers, will benefit from mortgage bro-
ker regulation, it argues for a comprehensive change in the regulatory
structure and applies the standard to all mortgage finance partici-
pants. Adopting this standard replaces the existing ad hoc, voluntary
acts that currently protect only some borrowers and will result in an
appropriate level of mortgage finance regulation that offers greater
protection to all mortgage borrowers.
II. THE MORTGAGE BROKER INDUSTRY-
THE STRUCTURAL FRAMEWORK
A. Mortgage Brokers and Financial Intermediation
1. The Mortgage Broker Industry
The mortgage origination process involves several different tasks.
A loan officer interviews the potential borrower and gathers informa-
tion about the borrower's finances, including their assets and liabili-
ties, that are needed for processing the loan. The loan officer then
assists the borrower in preparing an application. Assuming the bor-
rower's income and debt ratio qualify for the loan, and following an
appraisal of the property to ensure that the amount of the loan does
not exceed the value of the property, the loan is funded. It then be-
comes the responsibility of the underwriter to determine whether the
loan is eligible for the recommended mortgage product. 23
23. See discussion infra Part II.B.1 regarding underwriting and fiduciary duties.
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When a mortgage broker originates a loan, the mortgage broker
takes on specific tasks as the lender's agent. 24 A mortgage broker and
lender agree that the broker will represent the lender in offering the
lender's loan products to potential borrowers. 2 5 After interviewing
the potential borrower and gathering personal information for
processing the loan, the broker also evaluates the potential borrower's
financial status, considering affordability and stated preferences, and
may make recommendations regarding appropriate underwriting and
the source for funding.26
Mortgage brokers have become an instrumental part of the lending
process, and mortgage brokerage is big business. In 2004, mortgage
origination totaled $1.4 trillion dollars and 50% of loan originations
loans were made through broker applications. 27 The mortgage bro-
kerage industry has changed the distribution channels for loans, with
banks relying on mortgage brokers to negotiate credit with borrowers
and to develop and capture market share.
28
2. The Economics of the Mortgage Transaction
a. Financial Intermediation
Financial intermediation is the process of managing risk by bun-
dling, distributing, and pricing it. Financing a mortgage loan involves
a mortgage broker, who either funds or arranges funding for the bor-
24. Brokers who are correspondent lenders do not have to disclose the fees that they
receive from borrowers. Correspondent lenders choose an institutional lender
based the mortgage products offered and may fund mortgages from their own
funds or from the line of credit received from an institutional lender. Mortgages
funded with correspondent loans are pre-arranged to be sold immediately to an-
other lender. Brokers may become correspondent lender by building up capital
and being able to fund mortgages out of those proceeds.
25. As used here, mortgage broker may mean either a broker, a mobile home dealer,
or a home improvement contractor.
26. "Retail loan origination," may involve mortgage lenders and includes the adver-
tising and solicitation of the loan product; receiving, by interviewing the potential
borrower, the loan application; and performing some or all of the processing of the
application information. The mortgage products offered to a borrower are also
dictated by the lender's funding programs. Brokers may do a preliminary under-
writing review in order to assist the consumer in choosing a lender and product.
Typically, however, the broker neither performs the final underwriting nor
makes the credit decision. Gary Rice, Selected Issues Relating to Banking and the
Internet, 156 PLI/Corp 803, 843 (1999).
27. See The National Association of Mortgage Brokers, Industry Facts, http://namb.
org/namb/IndustryFacts.asp (last visited Jan. 15, 2008).
28. This is particularly true in the areas where banks have closed their retail
branches. Banks must now rely on mortgage brokers to create their market share
in these areas. See Orrice M. Williams, U.S. Governmental Accountability Office,
Alternative Mortgage Products: Impact on Defaults Remains Unclear, but Disclo-
sure of Risks to Borrowers Could Be Improved, Rep. No. GAO-06-1112T (2006).
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rower, a lender that purchases the loan at the time of closing,29 and
an investment company that adds the individual loan to a pool of
loans that are sold on the secondary market and in turn, sells secon-
dary market bonds to individual or corporate investors. 30 Each of
these sales is an important link in the cycle of financial intermedia-
tion and creates more financing for loans.31
Securitization is a byproduct of financial intermediation. By
securitizing loans, an indirect source of funding is created. 32 The sec-
ondary mortgage market arguably makes subprime lending more effi-
cient because it bridges the information gap for investors through
uniformity.3 3 Inefficiencies in the traditional governmental funding
29. A mortgage now can be:
(1) originated by a mortgage broker who makes money only from
origination;
(2) serviced by a mortgage banker who did not originate the loan and
may have bought the right to service the loan from another mortgage
banker;
(3) originated with the credit risk taken by one of the secondary market
institutions, perhaps along with a mortgage insurance company; and
(4) funded by a mortgage-backed security (MBS) sold into the capital
markets, and the MBS can be packaged as a bundle of derivative securi-
ties that separate interest rate and prepayment risk among different
investors.
David Reiss, Subprime Standardization: How Rating Agencies Allow Predatory
Lending to Flourish in the Secondary Mortgage Market, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
985, 994 (2006). Mortgage loans may be furnished by an institutional lender who
makes a loan to the broker or originator. Alternatively, a mortgage banking com-
pany often funds the loan using a warehousing line of credit. Warehouse lending
involves an institutional lender and an originator, which may be a financial insti-
tution or a mortgage bank. The institutional lender makes a loan to the origina-
tor which in turn funds the mortgage for the borrower. The institutional lender
is repaid with proceeds from the sale of loans to investors on the secondary
market.
30. The transfer is from the mortgage banking subsidiary to the special purpose vehi-
cle ("SPV), to the underwriter and the investors. See Tamar Frankel, Securitiza-
tion: The Conflict Between Personal and Market Law (Contract and Property), 18
ANN. REV. BANKING L. 197, 211-17 (1999).
31. The most common mortgage funding options are table loans, correspondent loans
and wholesale loans. In table financing, the originator sells the loans immedi-
ately after closing. The originator earns a profit by charging the borrower an
origination fee, which is essentially payment for funding a lender. Leonard A.
Bernstein, Regulation of Mortgage Banking: a Pennsylvania Paradigm,116 BANK-
ING L.J. 150, 161 (1999).
32. For example, secondary purchases require lenders to make representations that
the borrowers were evaluated for their creditworthiness and that the property
has been appraised using previously agreed upon appraisal standards. Henry T.
Greely, Contracts as Commodities: the Influence of Secondary Purchasers on the
Form of Contracts, 42 VAND. L. REV. 133 (1989) (discussing how standardization
of contract terms creates efficiency).
33. See Joseph C. Shenker, Asset Securitization: Evolution, Current Issues and New
Frontiers, 69 TEx. L. REV. 1369, 1383-90 (1991). Further, projected growth in the
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sources created a need for private money in this particular economic
sector.3 4 As a financing structure, securitization has increased abu-
sive mortgage lending.35 Structured financing in the secondary sub-
prime market requires a number of transfers and with each transfer
the actual terms of the loan escapes scrutiny.3 6 As will be discussed
below, when the transfer is made to the rating agency prior to sale to
the investors, there is little or no objectivity about the fairness of the
transaction and whether it may be predatory.
3 7
Intermediation facilitates the transfer of capital and risk between
borrowers and lenders and is justified on two grounds: (1) borrowers
hold superior information about their own financial condition than
prospective lenders; and (2) the search and screening process matches
borrowers and lenders and lowers search costs. 38 Mortgage brokerage
became an essential component of the subprime mortgage origination
market because brokers were able to reduce the costs of lending and
facilitate intermediation. Brokers also perform services that both
lenders and borrowers would find costly to do directly.3 9 By reducing
the information asymmetry and confirming that a borrower has the
economic resources to repay a credit obligation, mortgage brokers
housing market, again, underscored the concern that the present financing sys-
tem was inadequate. Id. at 1388-92. See also Michael H. Schill, Uniformity or
Diversity: Residential Real Estate Finance Law in the 1990s and the Implications
of Changing Financial Markets, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 1261 (1991) (proposing federal
residential real estate finance laws as a way of creating integrated real estate
finance markets).
34. The high interest rates of the late 1970s and early 1980s contributed to a signifi-
cant decline in the private supply of credit for the housing mortgage market.
When Senator Tower introduced the Secondary Mortgage Market Enhance-
ment Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-440, 98 Stat. 1689, he explained:
[Niew sources for mortgage money must be found as more and more de-
mands are placed on the credit market and mortgage lenders. Due to the
magnitude of the demand for mortgage credit, the existing Federal agen-
cies simply will be unable to provide all of the liquidity for mortgages
that will be required during the coming decade.
Secondary Mortgage Market Enhancement Act: Hearing before the S. Subcomm.
on Housing and Urban Affairs of the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban
Affairs, 98th Cong. 1 (1983).
35. See Evan M. Gilreath, The Entrance of Banks into Subprime Lending: First
Union and The Money Store, 3 N.C. BANKING INST. 149, 152-53 (1999).
36. See Christopher L. Peterson, Predatory Structured Finance, 28 CARDOZO L. REV.
2185, 2215, n.182. (2007). Professor Peterson uses the term "structured financ-
ing" when discussing predatory or abusive lending.
37. Secondary market participants have only nominal incentives to deter predatory
lending and therefore readily participate in the structured financing scheme. See
discussion infra Part III.B.4.b.
38. John H. Langbein, The Nonprobate Revolution and the Future of the Law of Suc-
cession, 97 HARv. L. REV. 1108, 1118-19 (1984) (Financial intermediation con-
nects "savers and borrowers, passive owners and active users of capital.").
39. See generally Bruce Greenwald & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Externalities in Economies
with Imperfect Information and Incomplete Markets, 101 Q. J. Econ. 229 (1986).
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have helped to expand an emerging market that was initially difficult
for banks to access. 40
Recognizing the scope of the innovation in the consumer mortgage
finance markets is critical to understanding the risks posed by finan-
cial intermediation.41 Financial innovation has created mortgage
products that unbundle risks, dividing investors according to their
risk tolerance and, therefore, creating more liquidity. The trend now
is for banks to serve as "equity bridges," reducing their exposure to
large loan risks. Regulated financial institutions now distribute
rather than hold residual risks.42 As a result, other financial in-
termediaries actually perform the functions that create, distribute,
and hold risk and have changed the manner in which those risks are
defined.43 The "newer" financial intermediaries are not constrained
by the same regulatory system that evaluates loan portfolios for safety
and soundness. 4 4 Perhaps because there is no safety and soundness
40. Banks and thrifts that hold subprime mortgages may face additional regulatory
scrutiny. Beginning in 2001, the Federal Reserve Board increased the capital
requirements for all institutions which held subprime mortgages that equaled or
exceeded 25% of their tier one capital reserves. The Board required lending insti-
tutions to increase capital reserves held against subprime mortgages to one-and-
one-half to three times greater than reserves held against prime mortgages. 2001
Guidance, 6 Fed. Banking L. Rep (CCH) 91 63-792, at 73,299-30.
41. Governor Kevin Warsh, of the Federal Reserve Board, describes the innovation in
the consumer mortgage finance markets as an acceleration toward complete mar-
kets that have conflated the roles among financial intermediaries. Govenor Ke-
vin Warsh, Fed. Reserve Board, Remarks at the European Economics and
Financial Centre, London, England (June 5, 2007), available at http://www.fed-
eralreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/warsh2007O6O5a.htm.
42. W. Scott Frame, Diana Hancock & Wayne Passmore, Federal Home Loan Bank
Advances and Commercial Bank Portfolio Composition 6 (Fed. Res. Bank of At-
lanta, Working Paper No. 2007-17, 2007), available at http://www.frbatlanta.org/
filelegacydoc/wp0717.pdf.
43. Most products are now securitized. Lois R. Lupica, Circumvention of the Bank-
ruptcy Process: the Statutory Institutionalization of Securitization, 33 CoNN. L.
REV. 199 (2000). Most consumer purchases are now securitized. See generally
Thomas E. Plank, The Security of Securitization and the Future of Security, 25
CARDOZO L. REV. 1655 (2004).
44. The availability of a liquid market makes mortgage-backed securities attractive
to investors and the diversification among the portfolio reduces risks. See Claire
A. Hill, Securitization: A Low-Cost Sweetener for Lemons, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 1061,
1073-75 (1996). The secondary market for mortgages makes capital accessible
across the country. Some argue that mortgage-backed securities are useful in re-
allocating capital by directing the loan funds into communities that are capital-
starved. Mortgage-backed securities may represent an investment in the geo-
graphical areas that they fund. In low and moderate income areas, financing
through mortgage-backed securities represents a way for investors to reduce
risks of delinquencies and defaults. See generally Jo Anne Bradner, The Secon-
dary Mortgage Market and State Regulation of Real Estate Financing, 36 EMORY
L.J. 971 (1987); Carrie Stradley Lavargna, Government-Sponsored Enterprises
Are "Too Big to Fail": Balancing Public and Private Interests, 44 HASTINGS L.J.
991 (1993).
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evaluation, they also have a higher tolerance for risk. By selling high
risk loans to investors who are willing to accept that level of risk, in-
vestment firms are contributing to the myth of complete markets.45
Changing the roles of regulated financial institutions in the interme-
diation process suspends their need to screen out borrowers who
might perform poorly or even to require strong covenants or monitor
loan performance. 4 6 This structured finance scheme does not identify
abusive loans, however, because the investors who purchase the
lower-rated tranches (bundles of loans) do not demand scrutiny of the
actual loan terms at origination.4 7
Market innovation has closed a financing gap leading to market
growth. The presumption among some economists is that this flow of
liquidity indicates that markets are more or less complete.48 Other
economists question whether there can ever be a costless transac-
tion-or one in which there is no asymmetric information or transac-
tion costs. 4 9 While innovative financial intermediation in the
subprime market has created competitive advantages that made lend-
ing to credit-impaired borrowers less risky for lenders, it also may
have created informational disadvantages for those borrowers. 50
b. The Market Imperfections
Market imperfections, or incomplete information that raises costs
and trades, affects whether individuals will enter into a transaction.51
Knowing what those costs are is critical to the decision of whether the
45. See Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, Turning a Blind Eye: Wall Street
Finance of Predatory Lending, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2039, 2040-41 (2007) (dis-
cussing Wall Street's practice of securitizing and selling loan pools without inves-
tigating their predatory lending characteristics).
46. Failure to demand scrutiny means that as the loans are sold they are freely as-
signable and the borrower loses the rights to challenge the original transaction.
See, e.g., Kurt Eggert, Held Up in Due Course: Predatory Lending, Securitization,
and the Holder in Due Course Doctrine, 35 CREIGHTON L. REV. 503, 511-13
(2002).
47. Petersen, supra note 36, at 2204 (describing how subprime mortgage tranches
are tailored to meet the investors's needs).
48. The concept of complete markets means that risks are priced and traded without
significant diminution in value. See generally Kenneth J. Arrow & Gerard
Debreu, Existence of Equilibrium for a Competitive Economy, 22 Econometrica
265 (1954).
49. See, e.g., Greenwald & Stiglitz, supra note 39. See generally Joseph E. Stiglitz
Federalism in Securities Regulation: An Economist's Perspective, 40 U.S.F. L.REv.
805 (2006).
50. See generally Franco Modigliani & Merton H. Miller, The Cost of Capital, Corpo-
ration Finance and the Theory of Investment, 48 AM. ECON. REV. 261(1958) (de-
bating the relevance of these costs in determining the value of a small business).
51. Ramon P. DeGennaro, Market Imperfections 3-4 (Fed. Res. Bank of Atlanta,
Working Paper No. 2005-12, 2005), available at http://www.frbatlanta.orgfileleg-
acydocs/wp0512.pdf.
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transaction is cost-efficient from the borrower's perspective. Reducing
the high cost of imperfect information is also essential to the lender
who would otherwise use adverse selection to screen out a borrower,
but who, if the costs are reduced, might find lending profitable.
i. Transaction Costs
One cost of lending is transaction cost. Financial intermediation
reduces search costs by pairing borrowers with lenders. 5 2 Lenders
and investors are served when intermediaries assist in diversifying
risk and providing liquidity. Finding investors is costly and borrowers
who have to do so on their own find it difficult. Securitization is help-
ful in reducing the transaction costs of lending precisely because
strictly private investment is difficult for the individual borrower to
arrange.
Brokers also provide market access for lenders. A broker's loan
recommendation, however, begins a series of transactions that may
affect loan sustainability (whether the borrower can afford the loan).
Mortgage brokers are essentially sellers of loan products and receive
compensation based on those sales. Competition among lenders can
be fierce for certain broker client bases and markets resulting in in-
creased compensation. As an industry, mortgage brokerage has devel-
oped indiscriminately with varying obligations and rules at the state
level.53
Mortgage brokers play a distinct role in reducing the lender's fi-
nancing costs and thus the overall costs of the loan.54 For the lender,
a mortgage broker is the first evaluator of information. They may offer
advice and information to a potential borrower that increases the bor-
rower's creditworthiness. Mortgage brokers also presumably make
the lender's market more competitive by identifying a broader market
52. Ichiro Kobayashi, Private Contracting and Business Models of Electronic Com-
merce, 13 U. MIAMI Bus. L. REv. 161, 176-180 (2005).
53. The United States is not alone in recognizing that the failure to have barriers to
entry for mortgage brokers disadvantages borrowers. Australia has studied the
problem of abusive mortgage broker behavior and instituted reforms. See Con-
sumer Credit Legal Centre, A Report to the ASIC on Finance and Mortgage Bro-
ker Industry (2003) http://www.asic.gov.au/asictpdflib.nsf/LookupByFileName/
Finance.mortgagebrokers-report.pdf$file/Financemortgagebrokersreport.pdf
(identifying problems when consumers have been exploited by borrowers).
54. The "retailing" of loans requires not only the time of lender personnel, but also
the bearing of the cost of real estate ownership or rental, i.e., the "bricks and
mortar," as well as the expense of payroll and benefits, business machines, sup-
plies, insurance and other costs necessary to maintain a retail branch. Cf Sid-
dhartha Venkatesan, Abrogating the Holder in Due Course Doctrine in Subprime
Mortgage Transactions to More Effectively Police Predatory Lending, 7 N.Y.U. J.
LEGIS. & PuB. PoL'Y 177 (2004) (discussing the FTC's abrogation of the holder in
due course doctrine in consumer retail lending).
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of potential borrowers.55 They are often key in identifying and reach-
ing customer bases which because of geography, or a lack of contact or
knowledge, might otherwise have never accessed the lender's prod-
ucts, thereby increasing competition. 5 6
Borrowers have come to expect a mortgage broker's assistance in
loan preparation. In many cases that assistance is critical to a deter-
mination that a borrower is creditworthy. 57 The borrower's transac-
tion costs are significantly reduced when there is a ready market for
subprime loans because of the liquidity of the underlying loan. The
borrower pays less for credit review and documentation. Any appar-
ent reduction in transaction costs helps to provide more access to
credit for the marginal borrower.
Arguably, broker participation in the origination process has dra-
matically reduced the transaction costs of origination.5 8 In a complex
residential finance market with numerous options, borrowers benefit
from mortgage brokers' assistance in selecting and arranging financ-
ing. While a potential borrower seeks access to the most competitive
lending opportunities, it is the mortgage broker who has easy access to
lenders and is aware of the guidelines and incentives. In the vast ma-
jority of cases, however, the broker will have developed relationships
with various lenders, and will serve as the "retailer" of the lenders'
loan products to consumers. In that role, the broker serves as an
agent to both the borrower and the lender.5 9 In such instances, the
broker/lender relationship is non-exclusive, and the broker is under no
obligation whatsoever to submit any borrower's loan application to
any particular lender for approval and funding. Brokers are thus free
55. Lenders not only pay mortgage brokers a commission when the mortgage loan is
made but may also pay a third party for identifying customers. Craig Steven
Delsack, The Mortgage Contingency Clause: A Trap for the Residential Real Es-
tate Purchaser Using a Mortgage Broker, 17 CARDozo L. REv. 299, 307-310
(1995).
56. Jessica Fogel, State Consumer Protection Statutes: An Alternative Approach to
Solving the Problem of Predatory Mortgage Lending, 28 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 435,
438-440 (describing the subprime market as one without much competition and
this much leeway for brokers).
57. Harold L. Levine, A Real Estate Focus a Day in the Life of a Residential Mortgage
Defendant, 36 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 687, 706 (2003).
58. If loans are over-priced, ultimately borrowers pay. The mortgage broker industry
also posits that broker participation has increased the sheer number of eligible
borrowers due to broker's ability to expertly navigate through the complex array
of financial products. The question is whether these brokers have contributed to
the high default and foreclosure rates. See generally Howell E. Jackson & Laurie
Burlingame, Kickbacks or Compensation: The Case of Yield Spread Premiums, 12
STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 289 (2007) (endorsing penalties against mortgage brokers
who receive the primary part of their compensation from yield spread premiums).
59. See Wilson, Effecting Responsibility, supra note 19, at 1507-08 (discussing bor-
rower's expectations in the mortgage broker relationship).
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to choose any one of several wholesale lenders' products for a particu-
lar borrower. 6
0
ii. Information Costs
Lenders also price loans according to information costs. Credit ra-
tioning is attributed to asymmetrical information costs. Asymmetri-
cal information is defined as the borrower having superior knowledge
about his or her ability to repay the loan obligation as compared to the
lender. Lenders often choose between making loans at high interest
rates or declining to extend credit. Adverse selection contributes to
this dilemma. Adverse selection means that only a few borrowers will
be offered loans at a higher interest rate in order to control the risk of
the loan portfolio and to assure that the lender meets its net profit
goals.6 1
Mortgage brokers have oddly both eased adverse selection and be-
gun advantageous selection. Because mortgage brokers are willing to
gather more information about high-risk borrowers, they are better at
screening and assessing the risks. Mortgage brokers exercise a signif-
icant informational advantage over lenders who, because of search
costs and regulatory restrictions, have more difficulty qualifying
credit-impaired borrowers. The current regulatory rules enforce the
informational asymmetries between credit-impaired borrowers and
regulated financial institutions. 62 Mortgage brokers have also "in-
creased" adverse selection in that they have consistently identified a
prototype subprime borrower, oftentimes seeking them out and alleg-
edly steering them to higher risk loan products.6 3 The growth of the
subprime market demonstrates that credit rationing is reduced under
certain circumstances. 6 4
60. Borrowers' remedies are extremely limited. Subprime mortgage servicers are
usually outside the scope of the Unfair Deceptive Acts and Practice Laws
("UDAP"), and borrowers face difficult burdens of proof and persuasion. Ronald
H. Silverman, Toward Curing Predatory Lending, 122 BANKING L.J. 483, 518
(2005). Furthermore, the federal statutes designed to protect borrowers in mort-
gage transactions are insufficient because these loans do not fall within the scope
of these statutes.
61. Loretta J. Mester, Leonard I. Nakamura, & Micheline Renault, Transactions Ac.
counts and Loan Monitoring (Rev. of Fin. Stud., Working Paper No. 05-14, 2005),
available at http://www.philadelphiafed.org/files/wps/2005/wpO5-14.pdf (positing
that transactions accounts held with financial intermediaries provide extremely
effective monitoring of borrower's behavior).
62. See Azmy Baher, Squaring the Predatory Lending Circle: A Case for States as
Laboratories of Experimentation, 7 FLA. L. REV. 295, 316-18, (2005).
63. Cecil J. Hunt, II, In the Racial Crosshair:Reconsidering Racially Targeted Preda-
tory Lending Under a New Theory of Economic Hate Crime, 35 U. TOL. L. REV.
211, 313 (2003) (arguing that a substantial amount of predatory lending is
"racialized").
64. See generally Larry T. Garvin, Credit, Information, and Trust in the Law of Sales:
The Credit Seller's Right of Reclamation, 44 UCLA L. REV. 247, 282-93 (1996).
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iii. Agency Costs
Lenders rely on the mortgage broker to screen loan applicants and
assess their ability to repay. Brokers then assume a dual agency role,
with both the lender and the borrower expecting the broker to act in
each of their best interests. Because lenders place total reliance on
the mortgage broker in screening the borrower and may do so without
imposing conditions on the broker's assessment, some of the loans
made by brokers are designed to fail, unbeknownst to the lender.
6 5
Borrowers, who with more careful analysis could have been screened
out because their credit history indicates either inability or unwilling-
ness to repay, are not. When lenders actually held the mortgage loans
that they funded in their loan portfolios, they were able to monitor
those loans and develop information that proved useful in evaluating
similar transactions. With lender monitoring now unnecessary, that
informational base is lost.66
Again financial innovation has created a market imperfection and
the lender should be held accountable for the agent's conduct. Other-
wise, there is little or no incentive for the mortgage broker to behave
fairly towards the borrower, creating moral hazard. Only by monitor-
ing the behavior of mortgage brokers are lenders or even secondary
market investors actually able to control the brokers' conduct.
The lender has a disincentive to monitor the mortgage broker be-
cause monitoring is costly. Securitizing the loan provides a further
disincentive for monitoring because once sold and the interest as-
signed to another buyer the borrower loses all defense to the original
transaction. 6 7 Because the risk of default is transferred from both the
lender and the broker to the investors, the loss is borne by the borrow-
ers. Similarly, as borrowers' risks increase and performance becomes
more difficult, borrowers have little incentive to perform creating
moral hazard.68
iv. Moral Hazard
Inappropriate behavior in the face of risk is the crux of moral haz-
ard. 69 The opportunity to have some of the loss of the risky behavior
65. See discussion infra Part III.B.3.
66. In the small business lending context, it appears that information asymmetries
are actually lessened by lenders' monitoring but this information is usually not
readily disseminated. See Amy C. Bushaw, Small Business Loans Pools: Testing
the Waters, 2 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 197, 209-10 (1998).
67. Eggert, supra note 46, at 552.
68. Moral hazard is common in most economic transactions. Moral hazard arises
when an individual or firm is insulated from the economic consequences of their
actions. Insurance is a typical example because it removes the financial risk of
property ownership from the individual.
69. See generally Seth J. Chandler, Visualizing Moral Hazard, 1 CONN. INS. L.J. 97
(1994).
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absorbed by another party creates an incentive to ignore the worst
consequences of risky decision-making. Moral hazard occurs with bor-
rowers who have an inability or unwillingness to pay and, conse-
quently, default on their mortgage obligations. Moral hazard results
often if there is some type of insurance fund that bails out borrowers
or allows them to restructure their debt.70 Mortgage brokers bridge
the information gap for borrowers who appear unable to repay but
who can actually afford the debt.71
The "other side" of moral hazard in subprime lending also has to do
with the asymmetrical information between the mortgage broker and
the borrower. In this regard the mortgage broker becomes an agent of
the borrower, acting on the borrower's behalf. As discussed below,
this creates a fiduciary duty on the part of the mortgage broker.72 The
breach of this duty occurs when the agent exercises what might seem
like a natural incentive to act in the agent's own interest. In mortgage
origination, this translates into the broker offering the borrower a
loan that is not the "best rate" but which may instead yield the broker
a higher commission from a lender.7 3 The breach, when viewed from
the borrower's perspective, happens because of information asymme-
try given the mortgage broker's access to lender's rates and products
and the borrower's inability to have access to that same information.
It is the borrower's inability to monitor the broker that creates this
particular moral hazard leading to the market imperfection.
The effect of a mortgage broker's moral hazard is that borrowers
end up with riskier loan products than they qualify for and the mort-
gage broker bears no responsibility for those risks. Mortgage brokers
who breach their duty to disclose do not bear the consequences of their
poor advice. They receive a "financial bail-out" when the loan is sold
on the secondary market and the consequences of their breach of duty
70. See George F. Will, Folly and the Fed, WASH.POST, Aug. 16, 2007, at A15 (arguing
against government intervention in the subprime mortgage market by restruc-
turing the loans of defaulting homeowners); Irwin Stelzer, Bernanke to the Rescue
With a Surgical Strike, SUNDAY TIMES (London), August 19, 2007, available at
http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/businesscolumnists/article2283092.ece (dis-
cussing Federal Reserve Chairman Bernake's decision to lower the interest rate
at the Federal Reserve's discount window).
71. Oftentimes these borrowers appear unable to pay because they own a business, or
participate in a cash business for which it is difficult to verify the receipt of
income.
72. See discussion infra Part III.B.
73. One study of the consumer mortgage finance market argues that subprime lend-
ers have a monopoly that allows them an informational advantage and deters
competition by restricting entry into prime markets. Because of the market
structure, subprime lenders have developed a pricing strategy that segments sub-
prime borrowers and charges them a risk-based monopoly rate. See Jie Gan &
Timothy J. Riddiough, Monopoly and Information Advantage in the Residential
Mortgage Market, THE REV. OF FIN. STuD. (forthcoming 2008) (on file with
author).
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are left with the borrower. Having received commissions from the bor-
rower and, most likely, the lending institution, brokers are not re-
quired to disgorge their profits if the loan performs poorly or fails.
Most importantly, the borrower suffers the greatest loss. If the loan
performs well, there has been a loss of equity because of the high costs
of the loan. If the borrower defaults on the loan, the property goes into
foreclosure. In both instances, moral hazard has disadvantaged the
borrower, while the mortgage broker is protected.74
The market imperfections that cause opportunistic broker behavior
can be corrected by providing borrowers with more information. By
failing to address the imperfect costs of which borrowers are unaware,
the market unfairly passes those costs on to borrowers through in-
creases in closing costs and interest rates over the life of the loan. The
question becomes what should the regulatory and supervisory re-
sponse be given these changes in financial intermediation. A mea-
sured response evaluates risk and market infrastructure. 75 As will be
discussed in Part II, the evaluation of infrastructure leads to the con-
clusion that there should be accountability at each level of intermedi-
ary involvement whether originators, lenders, or investors.
B. Reckless Lending
For an individual, owning a home provides access to quality educa-
tion and promotes job stability.76 Owning a home is also a path to
74. Robert E. Martin & David J. Smyth, Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard Effects
in the Mortgage Market: An Empirical Analysis, 57 S. ECON. J., 1071, 1073-1075
(1991).
75. Govenor Kevin Warsh, Fed. Reserve Board, Address at the Institute of Interna-
tional Bankers Annual Washington Conference, Washington D.C., Market Li-
quidity: Definitions and Implications (Mar. 5, 2007), available at www.federal
reserve.gov/newsevents/speech/warsh20071107a.htm.
76. The current crisis in the housing market disproportionately affects minority
homeowners and consequently the minority community. Blacks and Latinos ac-
counted for 49% of the increase in home ownership rates of the last decade.
Souphala Chomsisengphet, and Anthony Pennington-Cross, Subprime Refinanc-
ing: Equity Extraction and Mortgage Termination, (Fed. Reserve Bank of St.
Louis, Working Paper No. 06-23, 2006), available at http://research.stlouisfed.
org/wp/2006/2006-023.pdf. See also Robert B. Avery, Kenneth P. Brevoort, and
Glenn B. Canner, The 2006 HMDA Data, 93 FED. REs. BULL. A73, A99 (2007),
avaialable at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/bulletin/2007/pdffhmda06final.
pdf (describing the rise in home-ownership rates among balck and hispanic
Americans).
Sustainable home ownership produces a financial safety net for home buyers
and provides a foundation for a stable financial future. See Ending Mortgage
Abuse, Safeguarding Homeowners: Hearing Before the S. Subcomm on Housing,
Transportation, and Community Development and the S. Comm. on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs, 110th Cong. 909 (2007) (testimony of Wade Hender-
son, President & CEO, Leadership Conference on Civil Rights); DEBBUE GRUEN-
STEIN BociAN, KEITH S. ERNEST, & WEI Li, CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, THE
EFFECT OF RACE AND ETHNICITY ON THE PRICE OF SUBPRIME MORTGAGES (2006),
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wealth and asset accumulation for families and their future genera-
tions.77 For society, home ownership stabilizes neighborhoods.78
Home ownership also represents an investment in local economies
and, thereby, contributes to the country's economic growth.
79
Structural inequality, financial discrimination, and rampant greed
have combined to produce the greatest loss of home ownership equity
in this country.8 0 To suggest that the foreclosure crisis is a market
failure is to ignore the absence of regulatory discipline that bars ac-
cess to a fair and equal system of credit. Given the peculiar market
framework in which this lending is allowed to operate, an examination
of the factors that contribute to this market's tolerance is essential.
1. Underwriting Inefficiency and the Subprime Market
The housing market is a critical part of the country's economy, as
well as its social policy.8 1 Critical to the housing finance market is the
secondary mortgage market. By selling loans to investors, the secon-
dary market facilitates more cash for loans by providing a market for
quick liquidation of a lender's mortgage portfolio. This in turn gener-
ates cash to make more mortgages.8 2 The country's need for a robust
mortgage market has fueled much of the disregard about the harmful
available at http://www.responsiblelending.org/pdfs/rrOll-UnfairLending-0506.
pdf.
77. THOMAS P. BOEHM & ALAN M. SCHLOTTMANN, JOINT CTR. FOR Hous. STUDIES OF
HARVARD UNIV., HOUSING AND WEALTH ACCUMULATION: INTERGENERATIONAL IM-
PACTS 16 (2001) (explaining that lower income households receive substantial
wealth accumulation benefits from home ownership including higher educational
attainments for children in these households).
78. Predatory lending practices result in reverse redlining, a practice that Congress
outlawed in the Community Reinvestment Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901-2809. The root
of reverse red-lining is the same as redlining-the absence of regulated lenders in
financially underserved communities. See generally Cassandra Jones Havard, To
Lend or Not to Lend: What The CRA Ought to Say About Predatory Lending, 7
Fla. Coastal Law Review 1 (2005).
79. Duncan Kennedy, The Limited Equity Coop as a Vehicle for Affordable Housing
in a Race and Class Divided Society, 46 How. L.J. 85, 92 (2002).
80. Richard W. Stevenson, Spending It: Focus on Home Equity Loans-Predatory
Lending; How Serial Refinancings Can Rob Equity, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 1998,
§ 3 (Magazine), at 10.
81. See generally Tim Iglesias, A Place to Call Home? 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 511
(2007); Xavier de Souza Briggs & Margery Austin Turner, Assisted Housing Mo-
bility and the Success of Low-income Minority Families: Lessons for Policy, Prac-
tice, and Future Research, 1 NW J. L. & Soc. POL'Y 25 (2006) (examining whether
housing polices that require the relocation of low-income persons are effective).
82. Robin Paul Malloy, The Secondary Mortgage Market-A Catalyst for Change in
Real Estate Transactions, 39 Sw. L.J. 991, 1013 (1986) (describing the secondary
mortgage market as reducing the costs of home financing and increasing a local
market's economic stability).
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effects of the subprime secondary mortgage market.8 3 Home mort-
gages are now complex products, produced through multiple channels
and an array of secondary market processes. Many mortgage lenders,
especially in the subprime market, have tailored their practices and
policies to place most of the risks of these complex products on the
borrower.
A predominant flaw in the subprime market is the way that rating
agencies provide ratings for mortgage-backed securities.84 Rating
agencies evaluate four key aspects of a securitization transaction: (1)
frequency of default, (2) severity of loss given default, (3) pool charac-
teristics, and (4) credit enhancement and the structure of the security.
The evaluation of the four key aspects require an analysis of four addi-
tional factors: (1) qualitative, (2) quantitative, (3) servicing, and (4)
legal risk.85 It is the lack of oversight over this evaluative process
that indeed creates a problematic pricing structure for subprime
loans.8
6
Investors use the ratings to assess the probability that the under-
lying mortgages will be re-paid timely. In this regard, the agencies
reduce the common information asymmetry thereby making the se-
curities more marketable. Use of the rating system is endorsed by fed-
eral regulations. 8 7 Although there are numerous complaints that the
rating system is based on inaccurate information, the rating systems
do not have an incentive to be sensitive to anything other than inves-
83. See Julia Patterson Forrester, Mortgaging the American Dream: A Critical Eval-
uation of the Federal Government's Promotion of Home Equity Financing, 69 TUL.
L. REV. 373, 393-94 (1994).
84. Standard & Poor's, Moody's Investors Services, and Fitch Ratings are the three
major bond and securities rating agencies that rate mortgage-backed securities.
All three rating agencies have rating guidelines that prohibit favorable ratings
for any securities that are governed by state predatory lending statutes. Freddie
Mae and Fannie Mac also have policy guidelines that do not allow either entity to
purchase any loans that have predatory lending features.
85. Reiss, supra note 29, at 1013-14. Mortgage-backed securities are divided into
tranches, or Collateralized Debt Obligations ("CDOs"). The CDOs are classified
according to risk, equity (high risk), mezzanine (middle risk) and the much
sought-after investment grade bonds (low risk). Id.
86. See Claire A. Hill, Regulating the Rating Agencies, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 43, 46-64
(2004); Frank Partnoy, The Siskel and Ebert of Financial Markets?: Two Thumbs
Down for the Credit Rating Agencies, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 619, 627-54 (1999);
Steven L. Schwarcz, Private Ordering of Public Markets: The Rating Agency Par-
adox, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 15; see also Arthur Pinto, Control and Responsibility
of Credit Rating Agencies in the United States, 54 AM. J. CoMP. L. Supp.
341(2006) (highlighting the lack of control and oversight over credit rating agen-
cies in the United States).
87. The rating agencies use a self-determination process. There are proposed rules
for deeper scrutiny, but under the present system of regulation, the SEC makes a
case by case determination regarding Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating
Organizations ("NRSROs") for recognition. See Definition of Nationally Recog-
nized Statistical Rating Organization, 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-10 (2007).
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tor interest.8 8 The assigned ratings make the mortgage pools sold in
the capital markets valuable or invaluable, depending on what they
are.8 9
Investment banks can create a proportion of highly marketable
bonds out of a package of low-quality mortgages. They do this by sep-
arately ranking the tranches. The equity portion of a subprime loan is
classified at the highest risk level because of the probability that the
loan will not be re-paid by the borrower. This is also the tranche that
receives the highest profit, but receives loss first if the loan becomes
non-performing. The mezzanine tranche also has a fairly good pros-
pect of non-payment. The lowest tranche, the investment-grade bond,
has a chance of re-payment, which is why the ratings agencies give the
lowest-risk tranche a credit rating high enough to qualify for the criti-
cal investment grade rating.90 It is fairly standard, for example, to
convert a large package of mortgage-backed securities into perhaps
80% investment-grade bonds, 10% mezzanine, and 10% equity.9 ' But,
this is a matter of discretion among the firms.
The rating agencies do not issue consistent ratings and are not re-
quired to use the same information to create them. It is difficult
therefore to know whether the information used is even appropriate. 92
Some evidence suggests that the agencies are becoming more con-
servative and may be biased against financial innovation.9 3 While the
88. Gretchen Morgenson, Wanted: Credit Ratings. Objective Ones, Please, N.Y.
TiMEs, Feb. 6, 2005, at Dl (reviewing criticism of privileged rater oligopoly); The
Credit Rating Agency Duopoly Rellief Act of 2005: Hearing on H.R. 2990 Before
the H. Comm. On Fin. Servs., 109th Cong. 31 (2005) (statement of Sean J. Egan,
Managing Director, Egan-Jones Ratings Company) ("[Aidditional competition
should encourage the issuance of timely, accurate ratings."). SEC representa-
tives have argued, however, that market forces may keep the number of NRSROs
down, whatever the application process. See Hill, supra note 86, at 57-59.
89. Federally regulated financial institutions cannot purchase asset-backed securi-
ties that do not have the requisite rating. Specifically OTS and OCC regulations
require that the purchase must satisfy applicable regulatory requirements, in-
vestment guidelines, covenant restrictions, or internal policies. Investment Se-
curities, 12 C.F.R. §§ 1, 7 (2007).
90. The majority of the higher-yield securities are in the form of collateralized debt
obligations (CDOs) backed by "synthetic" high-rated tranches of securitized sub-
prime mortgages, which have been losing market value due to the defaults in the
subprime-mortgage market. Paul Tustain, Subprime Mortgage Collapse: Why
Bear Stearns Is Just the Start, MONEYWEEK, May 7, 2007, available at http://
www.moneyweek.com/file/31699/subprime-mortgage-collapse-why-bear-stearns-
is-just-the-start.html.
91. Id.
92. See, e.g., Larry G. Perry, The Effect of Bond Rating Agencies on Bond Rating
Models, 8 J. FIN. REs. 307, 313 (1985) (citing the frequency of disagreement be-
tween S & P and Moody's at 58%).
93. See Hill, supra note 86, at 64; see also Schwarcz, supra note 85, at 22 ("The
rating agency system, as presently constituted, is conservatively biased against
innovation.").
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rating agencies perform a much needed function, they exert tremen-
dous influence on the risk ratings and thus, the subprime loan mar-
ket. This raises the issue of whether the rating agencies favor states
that do not regulate predatory lending.9 4 By giving less favorable rat-
ings to loans that are not subject to state anti-predatory lending rules,
the rating agencies actually protect investors to the detriment of bor-
rowers who must purchase loans from lenders who are not policed for
their abusive practices.
The critical nature of the role that the rating agencies play argues
against market efficiency.9 5 While many have touted the subprime
market as efficient, others have questioned the market's profit-mak-
ing strategies. 96 The infrastructure, which is based on financing loans
where there is an expected poor performance by the borrower, a prin-
cipal balance that is not repaid, and yet investors who continue to re-
ceive returns, undercuts the notion of rationality.
It is more difficult to renegotiate loans that have been securitized
because they have been divided into different tranches. For this rea-
son, secondary market investors do not seriously police predatory
lending activity. The investors' concern about the risk of the invest-
ment results in the rating agencies imposing conditions that make the
pool of loans more expensive. Thus, moral hazard pushes financial
asset prices to artificially high levels, which prove to be
unsustainable.
2. Tolerating Default and Reckless Lending
There is a perverse incentive in the operation of subprime mort-
gage markets: Lenders identify and solicit borrowers who have a good
chance of not repaying the obligation.9 7 In fact, the profitability of the
94. See Baher, supra note 62, at 316-18.
95. See Stephen Choi, Market Lessons for Gatekeepers, 92 Nw. U. L. REV. 916, 934
(1998).
96. See Howard Lax, et al., Subprime Lending: An Investigation of Economic Effi-
ciency, 15 HOUSING POL'Y DEBATE 533, 556-569 (2004) (concluding that subprime
lending is inefficient compared to prime lending by evaluating the role of the risk,
borrower satisfaction with mortgage product and interest rate comparison);
Vikas Bajaj, Prospering in an Implosion; Subprime Market's Fall Plays to the
Strengths of a Bold Contrarian, NY TIMES, Apr. 12, 2007, at C1. See also Alan M.
White & Cathy Lesser Mansfield, Literacy and Contract, 13 STAN. L. & POL'Y
REV. 233 (2002) (recommending policy changes to the contract principle-the
duty to read).
97. See, e.g., Lawrence M. Ausubel, Credit Card Defaults, Credit Card Profits, and
Bankruptcy, 71 AM. BANKR. L.J. 249, 257-260, 264 (1997) (drawing a correlation
between a lender's tolerance of increasing default rate and the lender's profitabil-
ity). This phenomenon was even recognized by the bankruptcy courts in the
United States. See, e.g., In re American Home Patient, Inc., 420 F.3d 559,
569-570 (6th Cir. 2005) (invalidating interest rate because it would result in a
windfall to the lender); Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465 (2004) (cramdown
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loan portfolio depends on defaulting borrowers. In a competitive mar-
ket, it is rational for lenders to have a portfolio of non-performing,
high-interest rates loans. Lending to borrowers who are likely to de-
fault can go beyond equilibrium and extend to a profitable transaction
so long as the fees received by the lender exceed the cost of writing off
the principal.98
Lenders are well aware that the loans that they make are both
excessive, meaning the borrower does not have the ability to repay,
and reckless, meaning that the lender is conscious of but disregards
the financial consequences to the borrower when the loan is made.
Borrower behavior and literacy are not at the crux of these problems
nor should solutions be predicated on them.9 9
The repayment plan of the mortgages indicates that they are im-
properly made. Instead of the principal reducing, it increases. The
high rate of foreclosure also indicates that mortgage loans have not
been properly made. Receiving a subprime loan with certain features,
especially predatory ones, portends delinquency, with the likelihood of
foreclosure increasing over time.1 0 0
Foreclosure involves negative externalities. O As in personal
bankruptcy, foreclosure is not a 'fully isolated' internalized occurrence
interest rate should be based on an efficient market); In re Hernandez, 208 B.R.
872, 879 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1997) (discussing Sears payment plan that calculated
finance charges for non-payment as profitable).
98. This unorthodox business principal called the "sweatbox," refers to identifying
customers who will be unable to pay debt and allowing them to 'sweat-out' their
inability to pay until they finally default. See Ronald J. Mann, Bankruptcy Re-
form and the "Sweat Box" of Credit Card Debt, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 375. With
payment of interest, late fee payments, penalty interest fees and re-financing,
non-performing loans can be maintained to a "break-even" period.
99. John A. E. Pottow, Private Liability for Reckless Consumer Lending, 2007 U. ILL.
L. REV. 405, 407 (proposing an affirmative legal defense of "reckless credit" for
bankruptcy debtors to assert against undesirable loan contracts in response to
bankruptcy reform legislation that is too onerous on borrowers). Most scholars
are critical of the actual impact financial literacy education can cause. See, e.g.,
Susan Block-Lieb, Net Mandatory Protections as Veiled Punishments: Debtor Edi-
cation in H.R. 975, The Bankruptcy Abuse and Prevention Act of 2003, 69 BROOK.
L. REV. 425 (2004); Creola Johnson, Maxed out College Students: A Call To Limit
Credit Card Solicitations on College Campuses, 8 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y
191 (2005); Nathalie Martin & Ocean Tama y Sweet, Mind Games: Rethinking
BAPCPA's Debtor Education Provisions, 31 S. ILL. U. L.J. 517 (2007).
100. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, No. 04-280, CONSUMER PROTECTION: FEDERAL
AND STATE AGENCIES FACE CHALLENGES IN COMBATING PREDATORY LENDING, RE-
PORT TO THE CHAIRMAN AND RANKING MINORITY MEMBER 254 (2004) (statement of
Scott Harshbarger, Att'y Gen., Commonwealth of Massachusetts) (Predatory
lending practices targeting low-income neighborhoods may result in "the social
fabric of many inner-city urban neighborhoods [being] torn apart and communi-
ties destablized."), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04280.pdf.
101. Externalities generally refer to third party factors that effect outcomes. A nega-
tive externality in social economics terms is an outcome that is not socially opti-
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between a home buyer and a lender. Bankruptcy scholars identify two
factors which make up the "knock-on effect."' 0 2 Both factors capture
the psychological costs of debt in monetizable costs.' 0 3 One factor
evaluates the effect of bankruptcy debt on the debtors family and
friends and the other on society and the debtor's inefficiency at work
while under financial strain.,
0 4
Two troubling attributes of the subprime market contribute to
borrower irrationally and may lead to foreclosure. The first is the bor-
rower's cognitive bias for risk underestimation.105 Generally, bor-
rower behavior has been characterized as irrational when the end-cost
of the loan seems unreasonably high.106 Brokers' selection of irra-
tional borrowers in turn fuels the foreclosure rates in the subprime
mortgages. Borrowers irrationally agree to repay unserviceable levels
of debt simply because they cannot appreciate the nature of the obliga-
tion. We are witness to the fall-out of this now as borrowers are no
longer able to refinance and lenders go under. 107
The second troubling attribute that compounds borrowing irration-
ally is the lender's credit risk assessment, or ability to repay. The
pricing structure of many subprime loans is complex with variable
terms. Lenders find themselves in an advantageous position because
even if the loans default, lenders have received a profitable return of
interest charges and fees prior to default. The lack of price trans-
parency precludes all but the most financially astute of borrowers
from making an accurate assessment of the costs of a loan.
This incentive that lenders have to lend money to borrowers who
may end up defaulting on their loans is an aberration of the conven-
mal. See generally Kathleen C. Engel, Do Cities Have Standing? Redressing the
Externalities of Predatory Lending, 38 CONN. L. REV. 355 (2006).
102. See Pottow, supra note 99, at 411.
103. Bankruptcy scholars describe these as "intrahousehold" costs. Robert B. Chap-
man, Missing Persons: Social Science and Accounting for Race, Gender, Class,
and Marriage in Bankruptcy, 76 AM. BANKR. L.J. 347 (2002).
104. For example, bankrupt debtors are distracted from working at their highest and
best-use level of productivity because they are trying to cope with financial ruin.
See Mechelle Dickersen, Bankruptcy and Mortgage Lending: The Homeowner Di-
lemma, 38 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 19, 49 (2004).
105. In the credit card industry, "irrational discounting myopia" makes it easy for bor-
rowers to be seduced by plastic. See Pottow, supra note 99, at 413. For a general
overview, see Christine Jolls, Cass Sunstein, & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Ap-
proach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998); Oren Bar-Gill, Se-
duction by Plastic, 98 Nw. U. L. REV. 1373, 1396-99 (2004) (discussing credit
cards).
106. See generally Richard A. Epstein, Behavioral Economics: Human Errors and
Market Corrections, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 111 (2006).
107. Many subprime loans require frequent re-financing in order for borrowers to
meet the monthly payments. Michael J. Pyle, Policy Comment, A "Flip" Look at
Predatory Lending: Will the Fed's Revised Regulation Z End Abusive Refinancing
Practices?, 112 Yale L.J. 1919, 1923-24 (2003).
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tional paradigm of credit risk assessment. What is most significant
about the financing of subprime loans is the locus of the long-term
lending obligation. Traditionally, lending institutions have an inter-
est in the performance of the loan because it remains a part of the
institution's portfolio. By contrast, the current business model of sell-
ing the loan creates a disincentive at the time of origination and en-
courages recklessness on the part of lenders.
The rationale of perfect information would dictate that the bor-
rower make a decision not to accept the loan because it would be ap-
parent that its terms would lead to default.10 What happens,
especially in the adjustable rate mortgage ("ARM") market, is a prac-
tice that Professor Pottow describes as the "sweat box" in the con-
sumer lending market. In this practice,
[L]enders lure debtors into their sweatbox... by preying upon their underes-
timation and optimism biases. "Shrouding" the terms of their contracts
through moving price terms, the lenders attract borrowers-"manipulating"
them, in the assessment of some psycho-economic observers-who likely can-
not repay their debts and hence will be the most likely to sweat. The sweat-
box is actually a two-stage model that entices all borrowers at the outset with
low rates, but then cranks up the heat through late payment fees and penalty
rates for the "sweaters." 10 9
In essence, the costs of excessive credit is borne entirely by borrow-
ers who may or may not be financially literate, but who are surely
confused and sometimes manipulated.l10 A market response that
eliminates subprime lending completely is inappropriate because
there are legitimate needs.1 1 ' A market response that ignores the
reckless actors, is irresponsible to the extent that it relies solely on
market assumptions about the borrower rationality and information.
108. Economist Kenneth Arrow identified five criteria that any social choice should
meet. The criteria were: (i) transitivity; (ii) unrestricted domain; (iii) the Pareto
principle; (iv) independence of irrelevant alternatives; and (v) non-dictatorship.
See KENNETH ARROw, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (1963).
109. Pottow, supra note 99 at 417. Social efficiency from a positivist perspective evalu-
ates desirability or undesirability of a phenomenon by evaluating data according
to the established criteria. For a general discussion of positivist economic theory
see AMARTYA K. SEN, COLLECTIVE CHOICE AND SOCIAL WELFARE 56 (K Arrow, et
al., eds. 1970); W. J. BAUMOL, WELFARE ECONOMICS AND THE THEORY OF THE
STATE (1952); J. Baumol, Community Indifference, 14 REV. ECON. STUD. 44, 47
(1947).
110. Regina Austin, Of Predatory Lending and the Democratization of Credit: Preserv-
ing the Social Safety Net of Informality in Small-loan Transactions, 53 AM. U. L.
REV. 1217, 1253-57 (2004) (discussing how the informal economy affects minority
borrower behavior and advocating that credit democratization, particularly ef-
forts to curb predatory lending take into account the cultural background of
borrowers).
111. Joseph A. Smith, Jr., The Federal Banking Agencies' Guidance on Subprime
Lending: Regulation with a Divided Mind, 6 N.C. BANKING INST. 73 (2002) (dis-
cussing the banking regulatory agencies' efforts to define responsible subprime
lending).
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A transparent and priceable credit product that will allow consumers
to make informed choices about their credit levels-and, thus, only
use "good," economy-growing credit-is needed.112
A more comprehensive regulatory scheme of mortgage brokers
serves as a deterrence to "bad" conduct. It also corrects a structural
market defect in the way that mortgages are presently originated. In
this context, establishing a mortgage brokers' fiduciary duty to a bor-
rower places the liability on the party who benefits from an abusive
extension of credit and therefore ought to bear responsibility for the
borrower's injury.113
3. The Market as a Social Actor: A Symbiotic Synthesis
An unusually high foreclosure rate in the subprime market and the
loss of home ownership for first-time homeowners represents an insti-
tutional change to the pattern of increased home ownership. It also
destroys the beginnings of financial foundations for wealth
accumulation.
Viewing the harm of mortgage foreclosure, or even delinquency,
from the perspective of the borrower is consistent with a social institu-
tions economic theory. This perspective challenges the neoclassical ec-
onomic notions of the market as being based on a universal model of
rational behavior.11 4 Instead the question becomes how this economic
sector should provide for human needs.115 A social institution analy-
sis evaluates the different components of the market to address the
current issue: What is an acceptable rate of foreclosure in the sub-
prime market 1 16 and who should bear the costs of growth and pros-
112. Again, there are parallels from Professor Mann's work on consumer credit-card
debt. See RONALD J. MANN, CHARGING AHEAD: THE GROWTH AND REGULATION OF
PAYMENT CARD MARKETS AROUND THE WORLD 80-81 (2006).
113. The structural inequity of subprime lending becomes even more evident when
bankruptcy is the only option for subprime borrowers. The bankruptcy conse-
quences for subprime residential mortgages can differ than for prime mortgages.
The result is again a loss of equity. See generally R. Stephen Painter Jr., Sub-
prime Lending, Suboptimal Bankruptcy: A Proposal to Amend §§ 522()(1)(B) and
548(a)(1)(B) of the Bankruptcy Code to Protect Subprime Mortgage Borrowers and
Their Unsecured Creditors, 38 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 81 (2006) (arguing in favor of
amendments to the bankruptcy code that will give subprime borrowers the same
"fresh start" as prime borrowers).
114. See Peter J. Boettke, Where Did Economics Go Wrong? Modern Economics as a
Flight from Reality, 11 CRITICAL REV. 11, 16 (1997).
115. This theory of economic social institutions has its roots in Karl Polanyi, an econo-
mist who studied the effect of social relationships and institutions. See generally
KARL PoLANyI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION (1944).
116. Analysis of what an acceptable foreclosure rate should be is outside the scope of
this paper. What is most significant in evaluating foreclosure statistics in the
subprime market is that what seems like a low foreclosure rate 2.65%, represents
an increase of 80% over a similar reporting period in 2006. See Press Release,
Mortgage Bankers Ass'n, Delinquencies and Foreclosures in Latest MBA Na-
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perity of this particular financial innovation. From the borrower's
perspective, democratization of credit argues for participation in a ro-
bust economy by attaining exclusive property rights through home
ownership.11 7 Yet, that perspective also argues for a dramatically
smaller foreclosure rate than is presently projected.
Social institutions theory as applied in an economic context catego-
rizes and orders social interactions based on "non-economic" relation-
ships and institutions.1 18 As a result, decisions are social actions and
not solely classical economic ones. Similarly, economic institutions
are social forms. The relationships and intersections of the institu-
tional players are examined to see how change is effected.119
Social economic institutions theory can translate into a concept of
economic democracy. As such, there is a recognition of the economic
rights of all who participate in the economy. Socio-economic decision
making, based on equitable factors that fairly distribute control, dis-
counts the notion of property rights as being exclusive.12o In particu-
lar, the tangible economic interests represented by economic property
rights directly relates to the distribution of property. 12 1 The market,
tional Delinquency Survey (Dec. 6, 2007), available at http://www.mortgagebank-
ers.orgfNewsandMedia/PressCenter/58758.htm.
Social choice or social institutions economic theory has four predominate fac-
tors: 1) encourages and facilitates cooperation; 2) defines entitlements or prop-
erty interests that may be the subjects of exchange; 3) protects participants
against predation, including from the state and 4) imposes accountability. Wil-
liam K. Jones, A Theory of Social Norms, 1994 U. ILL. L. REv. 545 (1994).
117. See Robert P. Merges, A Transactional View of Property Rights, 20 BERKELEY
TECH. L. J. 1477, 1481 (2005) (describing connection between property and eco-
nomic rights).
118. See generally Peter J. Hammer, Arrow's Analysis of Social Institutions: Entering
the Marketplace with Giving Hands?, 26 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 1081 (2001)
(discussing Kenneth Arrow's theory on the role of social institutions in economic
theory).
119. Philosopher John Rawls is instructive on this point. Rawls posits that distribu-
tive justice requires that society maximize the life prospects of its least ad-
vantaged class. See generally JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALIsM (1993).
120. Profesor Stiglitz has teamed up with several economists and presents several dif-
ferent theorems that are relevant to this discussion. The Sappington-Stiglitz the-
orem "establishes that an ideal government could do better running an enterprise
itself than it could through privatization. See David E. M. Sappington & Joseph
E. Stiglitz, Privitization, Information and Incentives, 6 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS &
MGMT. 567, 579-80 (1986). The Greenwald-Stiglitz theorem posits market fail-
ure as the norm, establishing "that government could potentially almost always
improve upon the market's resource allocation." Bruce C. Greenwald & Joseph E.
Stiglitz, Examining Alternative Macroeconomic Theories, 1988 BROOKINGS PA-
PERS ON ECON. ACTriTY 207, 211-34.
121. KENNETH J. ARROW, The Organization of Economic Activity: Issues Pertinent to
the Choice of Market versus Nonmarket Allocation, in 2 COLLECTED PAPERS OF
KENNETH J.-GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM 133, 149 (1983) (discussing Arrow's well-
know examples of opportunistic behavior such as "adverse selection" and "moral
hazard").
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therefore, does not operate outside the context of the individuals who
participate in it. To do otherwise is to subordinate the interests of
some of the market participants.
12 2
The subprime mortgage market, and the predatory mortgage mar-
ket, in particular, represent a market transformation.12 3 A critique of
the organizational arrangement in which the subprime market oper-
ates shows that it is devoid of adequate oversight and regulatory au-
thority.12 4 It is chaotic in some respects.12 5 Given that the subprime
housing market operates solely to serve credit-impaired borrowers, it
is inconceivable to allow it to operate without protections. The advent
of subprime lending for home finance occurred without significant
study of the impact of institutions on patterns of behavior and habit.
It also developed with merely indirect governmental support and over-
sight.126 The justifications for home ownership in this industry merit
the same incentives and support as in the prime markets.
As a by-product of the transformed institution, the evaluation of
borrower behavior must be measured against the market's pricing
strategies. By necessity, that evaluation focuses scrutiny on the be-
havior of the brokers, lenders, and the rating agencies and begs, as a
matter of equity, for more regulatory oversight. The absence of suffi-
cient regulatory involvement and authority abdicates the spirit, if not
the letter, of the law. A uniform standard must apply across the en-
tire home mortgage industry. While the market should not be over-
regulated, presently there is an absence of regulation. It is contrary to
public interest to rely on the voluntary acts of brokers, lenders, and
the rating agencies alone to achieve a market correction. An interven-
tion is necessary to address the issues that are keeping the industry
from working efficiently and fairly.12 7 That intervention requires
evaluating the federalism issues unique to banking law.
122. See generally CHRISTOPHER L. PETERSON, TAMING THE SHARKS: TOWARDS A CURE
FOR THE HIGH-COST CREDIT MARKET 205-14 (2004) (arguing that high-cost lend-
ing has adverse spill-over effects on the economy).
123. Jane B. Baron & Jeffrey Dunoff, Against Market Rationality: Moral Critiques of
Economic Analysis in Legal Theory, 17 CARDOzO L. REV. 431 (1996).
124. See, e.g., Peter J. Hammer, Questioning Traditional Antitrust Presumptions:
Price and Non-Price Competition in Hospital Markets, 32 MICH. J. L. REFORM 727
(1999) (identifying market imperfections and legitimate professional goals in reg-
ulating trade restraints in healthcare).
125. Chaos theory is described as a system that goes from predictable to unpredictable
behavior. See Thomas Earl Geu, Chaos, Complexity, and Co-Evolution: The Web
of Law, Management Theory, and Law Related Services at the Millennium, 66
TENN. L. REV. 137, 268 (1998).
126. See generally Richard Scott Carnell, Handling the Failure of a Government-spon-
sored Enterprise, 80 WASH. L. REV. 565 (2005) (criticizing the federal policies and
statutes that regulate government-sponsored enterprises as providing for no
accountability).
127. David K. Musto & Nicholas Souleles, A Portfolio View of Consumer Credit (Fed.
Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, Working Paper No. 05-25, 2005) (examining risk-
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III. MORTGAGE BROKERS-THE CORRECTIVE FRAMEWORK
Most states regulate mortgage brokers. 128 However, most of these
statutes are not effective in eliminating subprime lending abuse be-
cause they do not impose an affirmative duty on the mortgage bro-
ker.1 29 Fiduciary obligations to the borrowers, and not just the
lenders, should be imposed upon the mortgage brokers.
The question of equity in regulation raises issues about the inter-
play of the state and federal governments. That question came more
to the forefront after the Supreme Court's decision in Watters v. Wa-
chovia.130 By upholding the Office of the Comptroller of Currency's
("OCC") preemption of state consumer laws, the Supreme Court's rul-
ing contributed to an ongoing debate about banking and federalism.
This section provides the corrective framework for Watters, first by
discussing federalism's three chief tenets-preemption, dual federal-
ism and cooperative federalism-and concludes by recommending co-
operative federalism as an approach that strikes the appropriate
balance between federal oversight of an issue of national importance
and state regulation of an issue that "quintessentially belongs to the
states."13 1
This section then examines fiduciary duties and argues that they
are at the crux of the current problem of regulating the misbehavior of
mortgage brokers. It discusses the dual agency situation that mort-
gage brokers find themselves in, representing the interest of both bor-
rowers and lenders. It also examines how the standard mortgage
broker agreement waives the mortgage broker's fiduciary duty to the
borrower and the implied duty of good faith is insufficient to protect
borrowers. It ends by proposing a federal approach for regulating
mortgage brokers that balances state and federal interests and serves
as a control on the opportunistic behavior of mortgage brokers.
adjusted consumer credit), available at http://www.phil.frb.org/files/wps2005/wp
05-25.pdf.
128. Although forty-nine states require mortgage brokers and mortgage brokerage in-
stitutions to have licenses, other requirements are minimal. See Wilson, supra
note 19, at 301.
129. Only Minnesota and North Carolina a statutory fiduciary duty on mortgage bro-
kers. See, e.g., Lawrence Hansen, In Brokers We Trust-Mortgage Licensing Stat-
utes Address Predatory Lending, 14 A.B.A.J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY
DEV. L. 332 (2004) (discussing the mortgage broker license statutes in New York,
Georgia, and Illinois).
130. Watters v. Wachovia, 127 S.Ct. 1559 (2007).
131. Id. at 1573 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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A. Banking Law and Federalism
Dual federalism separates the power and authority of the state and
federal government. 132 The Nation's banking system was envisioned
as a system in which federal and state regulation would operate sepa-
rately.133 In theory, state and federal banking regulators operate in
distinct spheres. In practice, federal and state banking regulation co-
exist with cooperation between the regulators.134 States have the au-
thority to enact laws in certain subject areas that federally-chartered
institutions must follow.13 5 Yet, federalism in banking law raises the
unique issue of whether the federal regulator's policy of expanding
banking powers deregulates federally chartered institutions, thus
making it difficult for state-chartered institutions to remain competi-
tive.136 In particular, the issue evolves to ask whether this expansion
of powers for national banks and the federal doctrine of preemption
132. The U.S. Supreme Court first expressed the doctrine of dual federalism in Texas
v. White, 74 U.S. (1 Wall) 700, 725 (1869), overruled in part by Morgan v. United
States, 113 U.S. 476 (1885). The doctrine has three related principles:
(1) the federal government and the state governments exercise exclusive
and nonoverlapping authority; (2) the allocation of authority between
the national government and the states rests on functional premises,
with the national government regulating certain kinds of matters and
the state governments regulating different matters; and (3) the courts
play an important and distinctive role in maintaining the boundary be-
tween the states and the national government.
Robert A. Schapiro, Interactive Federalism: Filling the Gaps? From Dualist Fed-
eralism to Interactive Federalism, 56 EMORY L.J. 1, 4 (2006); see also Ernest A.
Young, Dual Federalism, Concurrent Jurisdiction, and the Foreign Affairs Excep-
tion, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 139, 144 (2001) (defining dual federalism as a sub-
species of dual sovereignty with state and federal governments having different
jurisdictional spheres).
133. See generally Stephen J. Friedman & Connie M. Friesen, A New Paradigm for
Financial Regulation: Getting from Here to There, 43 MD L. REV. 413 (1984) (dis-
cussing the history of banking regulation).
134. Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Expansion of State Bank Powers, the Federal Re-
sponse, and the Case for Preserving the Dual Banking System, 58 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1133, 1159-1161 (1990). Cf Elizabeth F. Brown, E Pluribus Unum-Out of
Many, One: Why the United States Needs a Single Financial Services Agency, 14
U. MiMeI Bus. L. REV. 1 (2005). Federalism concerns arise in most areas of law,
including commercial law. See generally E. Hunter Taylor, Jr., Forward, Federal-
ism or Uniformity of Commercial Law, 11 RUTGERS L.J. 527 (1980); Neil B. Cohen
& Barry L. Zaretsky, Drafting Commercial Law for the New Millennium: Will the
Current Process Suffice? 26 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 551 (1993).
135. See, e.g., Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back Into the Political Safeguards
of Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 215, 220 (2000) (posits that contract law is an
area of state law-making); William J. Woodard, Jr., Constraining Opt-Outs:
Shielding Local Law and Those it Protects From Adhesive Choice of Law Clauses,
40 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 9 (2006).
136. Christian A. Johnson, Wild Card Statutes, Parity, and National Banks-the Re-
nascence of State Banking Powers, 26 Loy. U. Cm. L.J. 351 (1995) (advocating
that state legislatures expand state banking powers in order to make state banks
more competitive with national banks).
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facilitates the gaps in the current regulatory structure that have al-
lowed subprime lending to both proliferate and become harmful.1
3 7
1. Federal Preemption
The Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution grants Congress
the power to preempt any state law within its constitutionally dele-
gated powers. 138 Congress' intent to preempt state law may be either
implied or express. 13 9 Moreover, Congress may delegate to adminis-
trative agencies the power to enact regulations that preempt state law
as well.140
Express preemption requires an examination of both Congress'
specific intention as well as the scope of the statute.14 1 When the lan-
guage is clear, Congress' intent is straightforward. Rarely, is the stat-
ute unambiguous and the scope precise. Instead, the court must
reconcile the specific statutory language with the legislative history
and surrounding circumstances. More often than not, a court will ac-
knowledge the law's varying interpretations and will have to deter-
137. This Article does not describe the current state and federal law and regulations
that may apply to subprime lending because there are many excellent articles
that do so. See, e.g., Christopher L. Peterson, Federalism and Predatory Lending:
Unmasking the Deregulatory Agenda, 78 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 4 (2005).
There are 10 federal laws and five federal agencies that have some type of
jurisdiction over consumer lending. The FTC has brought nineteen actions alleg-
ing deceptive and/or illegal practices on the part of mortgage lenders from 1983-
2000 under Truth in Lending Act ("TILA"). TILA was the first major Congres-
sional effort at regulating consumer credit transactions. TILA requires the credi-
tor to disclose the amount financed, the annual percentage rate, the finance
charge, and the total number of payments to be made, including a payment
schedule. Most of these cases resulted in settlement and concession and promis-
sory obligation form the offending lenders. See Donald C. Lampe, Predatory
Lending Initiatives, Legislation and Litigation: Federal Regulation, State Law
and Preemption, 56 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 78 (2002).
138. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,
451 U.S. at 746 (1819).
139. Karen A. Jordan, The Shifting Preemption Paradigm: Conceptual and Interpre-
tive Issues, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1149, 1165 (1998). See also Nina A. Mendelson,
Chevron and Preemption, 102 Mich L. Rev. 737 (2004) (discussing the role of fed-
eral administrative agencies and preemption of state law).
140. See Fid. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 162 (1982).
141. Bates v. Dow Agro Sciences, Inc., 544 U.S. 431, 453-58 (2005). A majority of the
Court decided that a federal statute did not preempt state tort law on labeling
pesticides. Justice Stevens was particularly forceful in defining the limitations
on the scope of preemption.
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mine the scope or range of the statute. 14 2 The foundational question
is always to what extent Congress intended to preempt state law.
14 3
When courts cannot find express preemption, they will look for im-
plied preemption.144 Courts evaluating implied preemption evaluate
whether the federal interest in the subject matter is of such signifi-
cantly high interest that state regulation should be supplanted.1
45
This calls for the court to make a more probing analysis of the stat-
ute's purpose and goals and then to balance the statute's objectives
with the state laws on the subject matter.14 6 Courts may also evalu-
ate whether the state rule operates as an obstacle to federal occupa-
tion of a subject matter area. This examination evaluates the effect of
a combined federal and state approach to see if it will be impossible to
accommodate both.147 The impediment of a state law to accomplish-
ing the federal statutory objectives is also evaluated.14
8
Recognizing that both the state and federal governments operate
on a delicate balancing of authority, the Supreme Court has carved
out exclusive state authority on some issues. Absent a clear and man-
ifest purpose by Congress, these issues are left to the states. 14 9 In the
subprime lending context, preemption questions have arisen regard-
ing whether the OCC's regulations on visitation and preemption pro-
142. Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 894 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Justice Stevens dissented because the source of the federal government's preemp-
tive authority was an administrative agency's interim rule.
143. Robert R. Gasaway, The Problem of Federal Preemption: Reformulating the Black
Letter Rules, 33 PEPP. L. REV. 25 (2005) (arguing that courts should interpret
express preemption provisions very broadly).
144. Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 65 (2002) ("Congress' inclusion of an
express pre-emption clause 'does not bar the ordinary working of conflict pre-
emption principles.'" (quoting Geier, 529 U.S. at 869)).
145. M. Stuart Madden, Federal Preemption of Inconsistent State Safety Obligations,
21 PACE L. REV. 103, 106 (2000) ("Issues of express preemption are textual, while
questions of implied preemption are contextual.").
146. This is field preemption and applies in the cases between OCC and the states.
See Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977).
147. Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963) (discuss-
ing impossibility and preemption); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)
(discussing obstacles and preemption).
148. For example, HOEPA's prohibition against a higher interest rate on default in a
HOEPA high-cost loan, "preempts state law to the extent that state law is more
tolerant than the federal requirements for loans covered by HOEPA." Julia Pat-
terson Forrester, Still Mortgaging the American Dream: Predatory Lending, Pre-
emption, and Federally Supported Lenders, 74 U. CiN. L. REV. 1303, 1346 (2006).
149. Only those state laws that conflict with the purpose of national banks or that
impair the ability of national banks to execute their purpose are invalidated. See
generally First Nat'l Bank v. Missouri, 263 U.S. 640, 656 (1924); McClellan v.
Chipman, 164 U.S. 347, 357 (1896) (federal law prevails over state in the banking
law arena when there is a conflict); Davis v. Elmira Sav. Bank, 161 U.S. 275, 283
(1896). An example is the statute which expressly preempts state usury laws, the
Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980
("DIDMCA"), 12 U.S.C. § 1735f-7a (2000).
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hibit state regulation. Three circuit courts and the Supreme Court
considered this issue and affirmed that the OCC properly exercised its
authority.150
2. Watters v. Wachovial 5 1
The dynamic between state and federal regulation was tested re-
cently in the Watters v. Wachovia case. Whether federally chartered
financial institutions are subject to the enforcement of state laws
raises issues of federalism. In May 2007, the Supreme Court refused
to uphold a Michigan law permitting state banking regulators to in-
vestigate consumer complaints about banking practices. The Court
decided that federal banking regulations preempt a state's authority
to regulate the lending activities of federally-chartered bank subsidi-
aries, such as mortgage companies. The ruling is but a single exam-
ple of the kind of federal action that may thwart the efforts of states to
protect consumers from abusive lending that may occur within their
borders.152
In Watters, the Supreme Court upheld a regulation of the federal
banking agency, the OCC, preempting state law regulatory authority
over national banks and their subsidiaries. 153 Opponents of Watters,
and more specifically of the OCC's preemption powers, argue that the
Court's decision impermissibly threatens the dual banking system
and fosters an uneven playing field between federal and state
150. The Sixth, Ninth, and Second Circuit Courts of Appeals have held that the OCC,
as an administrative agency, did not exceed its authority to exercise jurisdiction
over operating subsidiaries. See Wachovia Bank v. Watters, 431 F.3d 556 (6th
Cir. 2005); Wells Fargo Bank N.A. v. Boutris, 419 F.3d 949, 960 (9th Cir. 2005);
Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Burke, 414 F.3d 305, 321 (2d Cir. 2005). As one scholar
has said, the question is not "whether the OCC is authorized to preempt state
predatory lending statutes, but rather on the normative issue as to whether the
OCC should preempt state predatory lending laws." Julia Patterson Forrester,
Still Mortgaging the American Dream: Predatory Lending, Preemption, and Fed-
erally Supported Lenders, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 1303, 1348-49 (2006).
151. 127 S.Ct. 1559 (2007).
152. For example, in Illinois where foreclosure filings totaled 72,445, increasing 55%
in 2006, the state created a Predatory Lending Database that monitors unscrupu-
lous lending practices. See 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. 77/70 (2007). The same legisla-
tion also regulates the conduct of mortgage brokers. The law limits the types of
loans mortgage brokers may offer their clients by requiring a suitability-type
test. The law requires that mortgage brokers verify the borrower's ability to re-
pay not just the principle and interest, but also the insurance and taxes. Mort-
gage brokers are also under a duty to guide potential borrowers through loan
comparisons. Id. Georgia has implemented a similar plan. Gary Whalen, The
Wealth Effects of OCC Preemption Announcements After the Passage of the Geor-
gia Fair Lending Act, (Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Econ. & Pol'y
Analysis Working Paper 2004-4, 2004).
153. Watters, 127 S.Ct. 1559.
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chartered mortgage subsidiaries.154 Additionally, as argued below,
the Court's decision to uphold the OCC's regulations compromises con-
sumer protection laws, which are usually enforced by the states.155
The issue was whether Michigan's mortgage licensing laws applied
to national banks and their subsidiaries operating within the state of
Michigan.156 Specifically, Wachovia challenged the authority of the
State of Michigan to regulate its operating subsidiary, which was
chartered under state law.157 The Michigan law at issue permitted
the state to investigate a consumer complaint if federal regulators re-
fused to investigate the complaint. It also imposed fees and required
they register with the state. It required operating subsidiaries of na-
tional banks to register with the state regulators and gave the regula-
tors the authority to "visit" and examine the national bank operating
subsidiaries and bring enforcement actions, if necessary, for violations
of state law.158
Wachovia successfully argued that preemption protects the charac-
ter of national banks and a system of nationwide banking by shielding
the banks from conflicting state laws that impede or interfere with
their functioning. The Supreme Court also agreed with Wachovia that
under the visitorial powers, states may exercise jurisdiction in certain
subject areas over national banks only when Congress by permission
allows.159 The OCC characterized its regulations as offering greater
clarity to existing restrictions that limit a state's regulatory power
over national banks and their operating subsidiaries. 160 The agency
154. The Supreme Court's upholding of the OCC's broad interpretation of its authority
fails to take into account the OCC's inherent conflict of interest. Professor Ar-
thur Wilmarth has written the preeminent article discussing the conflict and the
unfair advantage that the OCC's jurisdiction creates for subsidiaries of national
banks. See Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The OCC's Preemption Rules Exceed the
Agency's Authority and Present a Serious Threat to the Dual Banking System and
Consumer Protection, 23 ANN. REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 225 (2004).
155. See discussion infra Part III.A.3.
156. The Court's decision upheld the favorable decisions in other circuits. See Wacho-
via Bank v. Watters, 431 F.3d 556(6th Cir. 2005); Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Burke,
414 F.3d 305 (2d Cir. 2005).
157. On Jan. 1, 2003, Wachovia Mortgage became a wholly-owned operating subsidi-
ary of Wachovia Bank, a national bank. Chartered by the state, an operating
subsidiary is a separate corporation from the national bank, but under federal
law, it can engage in the same business practices, including mortgage lending.
On April 3, 2003, after making mortgage loans in Michigan for nearly six years,
Wachovia Mortgage notified the Michigan Office of Financial and Insurance Ser-
vices ("OFIS") that it would continue to issue mortgages without registering with
the OFIS, thereby violating Michigan's laws. Watters, 127 S.Ct. At 1565-66.
158. Two OCC regulations were at issue in Watters. They were (1) the preemption of
state laws available to national banks and their operating subsidiaries and (2)
the OCC's visitorial powers over national banks and their operating subsidiaries.
159. Id. at 1571.
160. Bank Activities and Operations; Real Estate Lending and Appraisals, 68 Fed.
Reg. 46119-02 (Aug. 2, 2003) (Codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 7 & 34).
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interpreted the passage of diverse local and state laws aimed at na-
tional banks as both interfering with the operations of national banks
and imposing unnecessary costs and expenses. In formulating its pre-
emption rule, the OCC used as a criterion whether the state law will
"obstruct, impair, or condition" national banks and therefore imper-
missibly limit the exercise of federally authorized powers. The OCC
based its exemptions on those laws which regulate the business of
banking as compared with those laws which govern the conduct of
banking business.161 Consumer groups opposing the OCC's regula-
tions were concerned that the regulations exempted national banks
from state and local laws against predatory lending. The OCC as-
serted its authority to determine predatory lending violations and to
regulate such abusive conduct under its supervision and enforcement
powers. 1
6 2
These recent developments necessitate reform in the regulatory
structure to protect responsible subprime lending. It is arguable
whether the OCC has properly exercised either its preemptive or visi-
torial powers. Even without preemption, states would have difficulty
enforcing anti-predatory lending statutes because of OCC's regula-
tions on visitorial powers. The real policy question is whether the
OCC, which denies that its banks are involved in predatory lending,
ought to preempt state predatory lending laws.
3. Cooperative Federalism
While both dual federalism and preemption serve their purpose in
the various contexts, 163 there is an alternative middle ground of coop-
erative federalism. Cooperative federalism is more appropriate in this
context because it advances the doctrine of state and local government
autonomy but requires consistency and allows federal intervention
when necessary. 1 64
161. Watters, 127 S.Ct. at 1569-71.
162. OCC's new regulation did not change the obligation of national banks and their
operating subsidiaries to be subject to applicable federal law prohibiting unfair or
deceptive practices in lending activities under § 5 of the Federal Trade Commis-
sion Act (FTC Act). 12 C.F.R. §§ 7.4008(c) & 34.3 (2007).
163. Nestor M. Davidson, Cooperative Localism: Federal.local Collaboration in an Era
of State Sovereignty, 93 VA. L. REV. 959, 964-68 (2007) (comparing preemption
and cooperative federalism).
164. Cooperative federalism as a regulatory structure covers a wide terrain of fields
including environmental programs, telecommunications regulation, health care
programs and tobacco regulation. Its benefits, generally described as "demo-
cratic experimentalism" have four basic categories: (1) state interests and auton-
omy; (2) local participation and accountability in public policies; (3) local
experimentation and interstate competition; and (4) using local, already estab-
lished bureaucracy. Philip J. Weiser, Chevron, Cooperative Federalism, and Tele-
communications Reform, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1, 31 (1999).
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Cooperative federalism is characterized by a strong federal govern-
ment with reliance on the state and local governments to work cooper-
atively to implement programs. It has two basic structures of
operation. One is receipt of federal aid when conditions are met by
non-federal bodies.165 The other is conditional preemption by estab-
lishing a minimum federal standard that non-federal governments
must meet in order to regulate a subject matter area reserved for the
federal government. The most common cooperative federalism struc-
ture combines the two: Congress preempts an area of regulation and
subsidizes state and local governments to implement the federal pro-
grams if they meet federal standards. 166
As a regulatory tool, cooperative federalism melds the competing
interests. It is a method of federal intervention that forces states to
address their inconsistencies without requiring a homogeneous ap-
proach.167 It also rejects exclusive reliance on federal courts and
agencies by allowing states to become more autonomous as adminis-
trators of federal law.168 In the area of economic regulation, the
shared schematic provides a workable model that balances the goals of
regulation with the concerns of business looking for the proper bal-
ance.16 9 Unlike dual federalism, in which there are few or no con-
straints in state program frameworks, and preemption, in which
165. Both state and local governments play a role in implementing federal standards.
See generally Larry Kramer, Understanding Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1485,
1488 (1994) (discussing federalism as sharing power between state local and fed-
eral governments).
166. Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Federalism in Constitutional Context, 22 HARv. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 181,185-86 (1998). Mills describes this as the "carrot and stick" ap-
proach of cooperative federalism. The "carrot" is when Congress in effect hires
non-federal governmental bodies to implement federal government programs by
giving them federal grants but the federal assistance is conditioned on the imple-
menting entities meeting specific program requirements. The "stick" is condi-
tional preemption. Using this approach, Congress creates a federal standard and
allows state or local law that is consistent with the minimal federal threshold to
replace the federal regulation. Id.
167. For example, in the area of welfare reform, which involves federal benefit and
entitlement programs, state and local initiatives are needed. See Sheryll D.
Cashin, Federalism, Welfare Reform, and the Minority Poor: Accounting for the
Tyranny of State Majorities, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 552 (1999); Michele Estrin
Gilman, Poverty and Communitarnism: Towards a Community-Based Welfare
System, 66, U. Pirr. L. REV. 721 (2005).
168. Philip J. Weiser, Federal Common Law, Cooperative Federalism, and the Enforce-
ment of the Telecom Act, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1692, 1693 (2001).
169. The use of cooperative federalism in economic regulation is a very popular notion.
See Reza Dibadj, Weasel Numbers, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 1325 (2006); Jill E. Fisch,
The New Federal Regulation of Corporate Governance, 28 HARv. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 39 (2004); Jonathan R. Macey, Wall Street in Turmoil: State-Federal Rela-
tions Post-Eliot Spitzer, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 117 (2004); Jill E. Fisch, Institutional
Competition to Regulate Corporations: A Comment on Macey, 55 CAsE W. REs. L.
REV. 617, 625 (2005); Renee M. Jones, Dynamic Federalism: Competition, Cooper-
ation and Securities Enforcement, 11 CONN. INS. L.J. 107, 122 (2004).
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there is a unitary uniform federal framework, there is what some
might term a "healthy" separation of powers.170
Cooperative federalism envisions a sharing of regulatory authority
between the federal government. States have the authority to regu-
late within a framework delineated by federal law.17 1 State agencies
may supervise regulatory programs that implement federal law.172
While the federal government has a broader constituency, greater
resources, and a national perspective on social and economic concerns,
states focus on local or regional concerns. 17 3 They also can experi-
ment with innovations and may try ideas that can later be imple-
mented nationally.174 States may also implement programs that are
too risky for the federal government to attempt initially. The shared
functions create an appropriate tension and have proven to be an ap-
propriate allocation of power and resources.17 5
This is very similar to what has been done in the area of environ-
mental law. Congress sets parameters by passing environmental laws
that apply to all of the states. States then have the flexibility to adopt
programs that are more comprehensive with the EPA intervening only
if the federal minimum standards are not met. The federal environ-
mental goals are set through federal legislation requiring minimum
federal standards. The programs are then delegated to the states, re-
flecting the "retention of the traditional notions of federalism."176 The
national goal of providing fair lending throughout the home mortgage
market can prove beneficial and balanced within federalist principles.
The advantage of federal oversight is national uniformity and the abil-
ity to monitor abuse and non-compliance while also clarifying the fed-
eral priorities. The disadvantage of this approach is that there can be
170. See Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Political Economy of Cooperative Federalism: Why
State Autonomy Makes Sense and "Dual Sovereignty" Doesn't, 96 MICH. L. REV.
813, 852 (1998) (positing that the reality of state and federal authority being com-
pletely separate and distinct is a flawed premise).
171. See generally Michael S. Greve, Against Cooperative Federalism, 70 Miss. L.J.
557 (2000).
172. This period of burgeoning federal programs represented a significant change in
state and federal government relations and required a greater deal of cooperation
for program implementation. A 1938 Iowa Law Review Symposium chronicles
this period of New Deal legislation and the developing relationship between the
state and federal governments. See, e.g., Symposium on Cooperative Federalism,
23 IowA L. REV. 455 (1938).
173. Ellen R. Zahren, Comment, Overfiling Under Federalism: Federal Nipping at
State Heels to Protect The Environment, 49 EMoRy L.J. 373, (2000).
174. Michael Abramowicz, Speeding up the Crawl to the Top, 20 YALE J. ON REG. 139,
157-59 (2003) (discussing the benefits of innovation in the corporate context).
175. Douglas L. Grant, Interstate Water Allocation Compacts: When the Virtue of Per-
manence Becomes the Vice of Inflexibility, 74 U. CoLO. L. REV. 105, 151-53 (2003)
(discussing allocation of state and federal authority within the context of the "law
of the union doctrine").
176. See MARTIN H. REDISH, THE CONSTITUTION AS POLITICAL STRUCTURE 25 (1995).
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tension between the state and federal governments, or that enforce-
ment can interfere with cooperative federalism.177 There is a legiti-
mate concern that federal standards may be enforced inconsistently or
become confused with the involvement of state courts. However, with
most cooperative federalism schemes, implementation and enforce-
ment are effective with the federal oversight.1
78
In operation, the federal banking agencies would retain enforce-
ment jurisdiction. The agencies would approve practices and modify
state authority when necessary. Challenges to the state's authority
would be resolved in federal court. 179 It is important, therefore, that
the federal statute have the proper scope and purpose.'
8 0
While both dual federalism and preemption serve their purpose in
the various contexts,' 8 l the alternative middle of cooperation is appro-
priate in this context. The doctrine advances the doctrine of state and
local government autonomy, requires consistency, and allows federal
intervention when necessary.'
8 2
Central to the imposition of a federalist model under cooperative
federalism is that the issue be one of national importance that justi-
fies the establishment of federal policy goals.' 8 3 The policy goals of
federal regulation are paramount. The federal statute becomes impor-
tant in establishing a threshold. By providing minium standards for
177. Robert L. Fischman, Cooperative Federalism and Natural Resources Law, 14
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 179, 191-93, (2005) (discussing the roles of state in environ-
mental enforcement).
178. See, e.g., Matthew D. Zinn, Policing Environmental Regulatory Enforcement: Co-
operation, Capture, and Citizen Suits, 21 STAN. ENV'L. L.J. 81 (2002) ( discussing
sharing costs as a reason to adopt cooperative federalism standards); George A.
Bermann, Regulatory Cooperation with Counterpart Agencies Abroad: the FAA's
Aircraft Certification Experience, 24 L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 669 (discussing the
FAA's international cooperative federalism scheme).
179. For example, in the environmental area, federal courts are called upon to deter-
mine the proper balance in the regulatory environment between the state and
federal governments. Ellen R. Zahren, Overfiling Under Federalism, 49 EMORY
L.J. 373, 391-393 (2000).
180. A federal court would review the challenges to agency authority using a Chevron
analysis. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. 467 U.S.
837, 842-45 (1984).
181. Nestor M. Davidson, Cooperative Localism: Federal-local Collaboration in an Era
of State Sovereignty, 93 VA. L. REV. 959, 964-68 (2007) (comparing preemption
and cooperative federalism).
182. Cooperative federalism as a regulatory structure covers a wide terrain of fields
including environmental programs, telecommunications regulation, health care
programs, and tobacco regulation. Its benefits, generally described as "demo-
cratic experimentalism" have four basic categories: (1) state interests and auton-
omy; (2) local participation and accountability in public policies; (3) local
experimentation and interstate competition; and (4) using local, already estab-
lished bureaucracies. See Weiser, Chevron, supra note 164, at 31.
183. Uniformity is needed to keep the playing field level and to avoid a "race to the
bottom."
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fighting fraud and deceptive actions, a federal statute can also provide
for both public enforcement and private rights of action.
Accommodating the interests of the state laws aimed at consumer
protections is not at odds with this approach. Because this is an area
that has traditionally been left to the states for regulation, the sharing
of responsibility may produce the most efficient result for borrowers.
States have long shown great responsibility and initiative in monitor-
ing consumer activities and passing effective legislation. It is the un-
evenness in states' action to a national problem, however, that calls
for a modified approach in this area. The problem in this particular
area is that not all states have taken action. Second, federal preemp-
tion effectively minimizes a great deal of success that state laws have
achieved in addressing abusive lending practices. Some state legisla-
tures have shown a great deal of initiative in passing effective legisla-
tion. Likewise, state executives have used their resources to bring
successful actions that halted unfair or deceptive practices and pun-
ished bad actors, and none of this has had a negative effect on the flow
of capital in these jurisdictions. Yet, state laws have still been inef-
fective in their efforts to corral mortgage broker abuse for a number of
reasons. For instance, the lack of comprehensive coverage has meant
that the brokers simply avoid making loans in states where there is
extensive regulation and potential liability.18 4
The new and innovative financial products of the consumer mort-
gage market require a balancing of how to expand access to subprime
lending while also protecting borrowers from the abuses of a financial
marketplace. By establishing a federal threshold of fiduciary duty to
borrowers, minimum federal parameters are set that can be expanded
as needed to provide enhanced protections.
B. Fiduciary Duty
Fiduciary obligation is a context-bound legal obligation based on a
formally established and recognized agency relationship.' 8 5 Agency
law is fairly simplistic in defining fiduciary duties when the agent has
expressly decided to act for or on behalf of a principal.1 8 6 Three gener-
184. Neil J. Morse, The Predatory Lending Obstacle Course, MORTGAGE BANKING, Apr.
2002, at 53-59.
185. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1 (1958). Often a broadly defined concept,
fiduciary duty has its origins in equity.
186. See generally FDIC v. Canfield, 763 F. Supp. 533 (D. Utah 1991) (bank directors
held liable under standard of gross negligence for lending decisions) (rev'd on
other grounds); Arnott v. American Oil Co., 609 F.2d 873 (8th Cir. 1979) (finding
that a fiduciary relationship existed between a service-station owner and an oil
company that fraudulently induced the service station owner to entering into a
lease); Photovest Corp. v. Fotomat Corp., 606 F.2d 704 (7th Cir. 1979) (holding
francisor liable for violating fiduciary duties to its franchisee); Harold Brown,
Franchising-A Fiduciary Relationship, 49 TEX. L. REV. 650 (1971) (discussing
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ally recognized duties-the duty of care, the duty of loyalty, and the
duty of good faith-are designed to control opportunistic and abusive
conduct and are considered to be more than a mere implied contrac-
tual obligation.18 7 The duty of care requires that the fiduciary con-
sider the appropriate information in making decision's on behalf of the
fiduciary.' 8 8 The duty of loyalty requires that the fiduciary safeguard
the principal's assets and specifically guard against misappropriation
of assets that the fiduciary manages or supervises.' 8 9 The fiduciary
duty of good faith-which is distinguished from the implied contrac-
tual term-evaluates whether the fiduciary has taken actions that
demonstrate a conscious and intentional disregard of risks to the prin-
cipal. 190 A violation of any one of these duties requires the fiduciary
to be held accountable. The situations in which the duties arise under
common law may vary.191
Fiduciary duties are based on the structure of the relationship.1
9 2
The likelihood of harm and the magnitude of the potential harm sup-
franchisor liability for breach of fiduciary duties to franchisees). A discussion
about the creation of specific fiduciary duties in the lending relationship is be-
yond the scope of this Article; therefore, the following discussion will focus solely
on general fiduciary duties created by a court's determination that a mortgage
broker becomes the agent of a borrower based solely upon her status as a "bro-
ker." For a thorough analysis of the creation of specific fiduciary duties within
the lender-borrower relationship, see Cecil J. Hunt, II, The Price of Trust: An
Examination of Fiduciary Duty and the Lender-Borrower Relationship, 29 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 719 (1994).
187. Victor Brudney, Contract and Fiduciary Duty in Corporate Law, 38 B.C. L. Rev.
595, 635 (1997) ("[Tlraditional fiduciary loyalty strictures more rigorously protect
... against opportunistic behavior... than does classic contract doctrine.").
188. See Smith v. Van Gorkham, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985).
189. D. Gordon Smith, The Critical Resource Theory of Fiduciary Duty, 55 VAND. L.
REV. 1399, 1490-91 (distinguishing contract duty of good faith from fiduciary
duty by stating that "[t]he only material difference between the relationships is
that contracting parties 'exercise ... discretion in performance' whereas fiducia-
ries exercise discretion with respect to a critical resource." (quoting Steven J.
Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to Perform in Good Faith,
94 HARv. L. REV. 369, 394 n.109 (1980)).
190. A fiduciary duty is typically more expansive than contractual duty. While a fidu-
ciary duty is determined by the structure of the relationship, the obligation of
good faith and fair dealing emanates from the terms of the contract. Id. at
1490-91; Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Contract & Fiduciary Duty,
36 J.L. & Econ. 425, 438 (1993) ("When transactions costs reach a particularly
high level, some persons start calling some contractual relations fiduciary, but
this should not mask the continuum.").
191. Common law fiduciary obligations are derived from the need to control one per-
son's discretion based on her relationship with another. See generally Kenneth B.
Davis, Jr., Judicial Review of Fiduciary Decisionmaking-Some Theoretical Per-
spectives, 80 Nw. U.L. REV. 1 (1985) (explaining fiduciary duty in the context of
private bargaining).
192. See Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 307 n.14 (1939) (citing Twin-Lick Oil Co. v.
Marbury, 91 U.S. 587, 590 (1875)).
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port the imposition of a duty. Thus, the principal's inability to control
the fiduciary from acting in a self-serving and opportunistic manner
creates a need to define a fiduciary duty as a "legal rule designed to
limit [that] discretion."'19 3
Fiduciary duties may be contractual because the parties have ex-
press or implied duties for defined behavior.194 Recognizing that con-
tracts are voluntary transactions, some argue that fiduciary duties
ought not be reduced to a waivable contract term.19 5 When contract
law chooses to define fiduciary duties, it is within the parties' discre-
tion to negotiate the scope of those duties. The parties, presumably
equals, determine under what circumstances the fiduciary consents to
serve. The pre-determined agreement conclusively fixes the fiduci-
ary's duties. 196
Fiduciary duties may also be relational. Courts are willing to im-
ply fiduciary duties in certain circumstances-i.e., attorneys, account-
ants, real estate agents, and other confidential relationships. In those
instances, courts resolve relational fiduciary duties on a case-by-case
basis.197 Courts seem more likely to recognize a relational fiduciary
duty when there is also some other egregious factor present.198 The
goal of fiduciary law is to reduce the principal's risk.199 Its informal-
ity makes it readily available and not subject to the constraints of the
193. Smith, supra note 189, at 1490.
194. Hunt, supra note 186, at 765 (arguing that the presumption against finding a
fiduciary duty in commercial transactions is fundamentally flawed and suggests
that instead the inquiry should be whether a fiduciary duty has arisen with re-
spect to a particular aspect of the transaction).
195. Reza Dibadj, The Misguided Transformation of Loyalty into Contract, 41 TULSA
L. REV. 451, 458-59 (2006).
196. See Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation,
1988 Duke L. .J. 879, 879. Professor DeMott argues that, "[a]lthough one can
identify common core principles of fiduciary obligation, these principles apply
with greater or lesser force in different contexts involving different types of par-
ties and relationships. [T]he law of fiduciary obligation is situation-specific." Id.
See also Frankel, Securitization, supra note 30, at 822 (recognizing that court's
will inquire into the nature f the fiduciary duty even when there is a specific
waiver of the duty).
197. Consol. Insured Benefits, Inc. v. Conseco Med. Ins. Co., No. 6:03-cv-03211-RBH,
2006 WL 3423891 (D. S.C. Nov. 27, 2006) (stating in dicta that such duties apply
to attorneys); Graefe v. Vaughn, 972 P.2d 317 (Idaho Ct. App. 1999) (stating in
dicta that such duties apply to accountants).
198. Courts look for factors such as "inequality, dependence, weakness of age, of
mental strength, business intelligence, knowledge of the facts involved or other
conditions giving to one an advantages over the other." Yuster v. Keefe, 90 N.E.
920, 922 (Ind. Ct. App. 1910); see also Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Fordham, 130
B.R. 632, 649 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1991) ("fiduciary obligation often involves a party
in a position of "inequality, inferiority, or other disadvantage").
199. See generally Robert Cooter & Bradley J. Freedman, The Fiduciary Relationship:
Its Economic Character and Legal Consequences, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1045 (1991);
Deborah A. DeMott, Disloyal Agents, 58 ALA. L. REV. 1049 (2007).
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bargaining process. But the real benefit is that fiduciary duties con-
trol behavior that is neither specifically identified nor addressed and
gives the principal the right to justifiably rely on the actions of the
agent.20 0 The discussion below focuses on fiduciary duties in dual
agency and independent contractor classification and how the duties
may be implied in the context of contractual good faith.
1. Fiduciary Duty-A Comparison of Dual Agency, Independent
Contractor, and Implied Duty of Good Faith
a. Dual Agency
As an instrumental part of the loan origination process, mortgage
brokers assume a common law agency duty.20 1 What the borrower
does not know is that the typical representation contract allows the
mortgage broker to be a dual agent.20 2 The mortgage broker may al-
ready be an agent of one or more lenders. When the mortgage broker
recommends a particular lender's mortgage product to the borrower,
dual agency is created because the mortgage broker will represent
200. See William W. Bratton, Berle & Means Reconsidered at the Century's Turn, 26 J.
CORP. L. 737, 762 (2001); Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Politics of Corporate Gov-
ernance, 18 H~av. J.L. & PUB. POL'v, 671, 672 (1995).
201. See generally Wyatt v. Union Mortgage Co., 598 P.2d 45 (Cal. 1979) (holding
mortgage broker liable for breach of fiduciary duty towards plaintiff as principles
in connection with negotiation of a second mortgage when loan broker misrepre-
sented the terms of the loan, including the extent of interest, late charges, and
balloon payments); Taborsky v. Mathews, 121 So.2d 61, (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1960)
(holding that parties may void real estate agreement where broker did not dis-
close dual nature of his agency to purchasers); Spratlin, Harrington & Thomas,
Inc. v. Hawn, 156 S.E.2d 402 (Ga. Ct. App.1967) (holding that dual agency pro-
hibited if not disclosed); Hughes v. Robbins, 164 N.E.2d 469 (Ohio Com.Pl. 1959)
(holding that a real estate broker who represents both parties to transaction,
even if one of his principals were aware of such dual agency, cannot recover com-
mission from either of his principals, unless both knew of and consented to or
acquiesced in such double employment); Lass v. Meinhart, 15 Ohio Law Abs. 272,
39 Ohio Law Rep. 37 (Ohio Ct. App. 1933) (holding that a real estate agent has
the sole responsibility to disclose dual agency).
202. See Godfrey v. Steinpress, 128 Cal. App. 3d 154, 177-78, 180 Cal. Rptr. 95, 107
(Cal. Ct. App. 1982) (finding that dual agency was implied from the agent's con-
duct). Dual agency was at one point a particularly popular remedy in the real
estate setting when a buyer challenged the lack of representation by a real estate
broker that represented both the buyer and the seller in a transaction. Buyers
challenged real estate brokers independence because the real estate broker repre-
sented both buyer and seller. Some courts attempted to make up for the lack of
buyer representation by finding the cooperating broker to be an agent of the
buyer as well as of the seller. See Nat'l Ass'n of Realtors, Agency and Real Estate,
at 2-3 (November 1986) (citing Grnadchamp v. Patzer, 197 N.W.2d 537 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1972)) (on file with author). One commentator criticizes dual agency as a
solution to deterring the real estate broker's misconduct because it only allows
the buyer a remedy after the transaction is complete. See Matthew M. Collette,
Sub-Agency in Residential Real Estate Brokerage: A Proposal to End the Struggle
with Reality, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 399 (1988).
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both the borrower and the lender in the same transaction. While this
is a conflict of interest, it is resolved through disclosure to both bor-
rower and lender, usually in the separate contracts that they have en-
tered into with the mortgage broker. In this dual capacity, the
mortgage broker has confidential information about the borrower's fi-
nancial condition and the lender's pricing policies. The expected out-
come is different as well. The borrower wants the lowest possible
interest rate on the mortgage while the lender, as well as the mort-
gage broker, benefit when the interest rate is the highest. The ques-
tion becomes whether the inherent conflict of interest can adequately
be assuaged given the dramatic differences in the borrower's and lend-
ers' interests.2
03
Courts resolve the issue most often against the borrower finding no
distinction in the broker's obligations and holding in essence that con-
tract terms waived the duty.20 4 What these courts have failed to rec-
203. Robert E. Kroll, Dual Agency Problems in Residential Real Estate Brokerage:
Conflict of Interest and Interests in Conflict, 12 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 379, 379
(1982).
204. See Weinberger v. Kendrick, 698 F.2d 61, 79 (2d Cir. 1982) (holding that a lender,
who is on the opposite side of the negotiating table, does not act as a fiduciary);
Bank of Red Bay v. King, 482 So. 2d 274, 285 (Ala. 1985) (holding that no fiduci-
ary duty exists between the parties because the parties have equal bargaining
power and the borrower did not request disclosure); Dolton v. Capitol Fed. Sav. &
Loan Ass'n, 642 P.2d 21, 23 (Colo. Ct. App. 1981) (holding that only special cir-
cumstances justify fiduciary duty in a debtor and creditor relationship); Cooper
v. Burby, No. 387563, 1992 WL 97044, at *4-5 (Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 29, 1992)
(finding that the morgage broker and borrower stand at arm's length"); Mid-
America Nat'l Bank v. First Sav. & Loan of South Holland, 515 N.E.2d 176, 181
(Ill. App. Ct. 1987) ( holding that a "conventional mortgagor-mortgage relation-
ship .... standing alone, is insufficient" to impose a fiduciary relationship);
Vacinek v. First Nat'l Bank of Pine City, 416 N.W.2d 795, 799 (Minn. Ct. App.
1987) (stating that a customer must tell the bank or the bank ought to know if its
customer is placing confidence in the bank); UT Communications Credit Corp. v.
Resort Dev., Inc., 861 S.W.2d 699, 710 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993) (finding no relation-
ship between a bank as lender and its customer as borrower); Deist v. Wachholz,
678 P.2d 188, 193 (Mont. 1984) (finding no fiduciary duty in a bank's debtor and
creditor relationship); Stone v. Davis, 419 N.E.2d 1094, 1098 (Ohio 1981) (holding
that a "mortgage loan is an arm's length transaction"); Umbaugh Pole Bldg. Co.,
Inc. v. Scott, 390 N.E.2d 320, 321 (Ohio 1979) (holding that an informal relation-
ship creates a fiduciary duty only when special trust or confidence is known);
Production Credit Ass'n of Lancaster v. Croft, 423 N.W.2d 544, 546 (Wis. Ct. App.
1988) (holding that a borrower-customer relationship does not create a fiduciary
relationship).
Cf Munday v. Real Estate Advisors, Inc., No. C-95-20143-JW, 1995 WL
549015, at *2-3 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 12, 1995) (holding that a mortgage broker
breached its fiduciary duty to borrower by failing to disclose that the non-record-
ing of certain documents is not the custom in the real estate industry); Wyatt v.
Union Mortgage Company, 598 P.2d 45 (Cal. 1979) (finding a fiduciary duty be-
tween mortgage loan broker and mortgagor); Mitchell v. Aames Home Loan Co.,
No. B021272, 1987 WL 13307, at *5 (Cal. Ct. App. May 21, 1987) (stating in dicta
that a mortgage broker may have a fiduciary duty); UMET Trust v. Santa Monica
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ognize, however, is the triangular relationship of the broker, borrower,
and lender.20
5
Courts are willing to concede that an agent can serve as a fiduciary
to more then one principal in the same transaction. 20 6 In those cir-
cumstances, an agent must disclose the relationship with the other to
both principals. 20 7 Courts rarely, however, inquire into the specific
manner in which the disclosure is made in order to see if is was effec-
tive. This is problematic because it provides a limited basis for a court
to examine the sufficiency of the disclosure. Commonly, the borrower
and the mortgage broker enter into an agreement for services. It is in
this agreement, a stock, form agreement drafted undoubtedly to best
capture the interests of the mortgage broker, that the borrower agrees
to dual representation. Assuming that such a signed agreement is
sufficient to absolve a fiduciary from liability, it is hard to imagine
that a court that relies solely on this agreement has made the critical
examination of the scope of the agreement or of the surrounding
circumstances. 20 8
The circumstances surrounding the disclosure and an inquiry into
the borrower's understanding regarding the dual agency seem ger-
mane. The fiduciary's disclosure in the representation agreement ef-
fect is the borrower's waiver. As such, the court must determine
Med. Inv. Co., 140 Cal. App. 3d 864, 873 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (holding that failing
to disclose the negative legal consequences of sale leaseback financing is a breach
of fiduciary duty); Rushing v. Stephanus, 393 P.2d 281 (Wash. 1964) (finding a
fiduciary relationship between lender and borrower).
205. Delsack v. Cumella, 593 N.Y.S.2d 2 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993).
206. Coldwell Banker Commercial Group, Inc. v. Nodvin, 598 F.Supp. 853 (N.D.Ga.
1984) (holding that dual agency is not per se improper).
207. See, e.g., John Conlon Coal Co. v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co. of New York,16
F.Supp. 93 (M.D Pa. 1936) (stating that there must be notice of dual agency in
order for it to be effective).
208. Linda S. Mullenix, Choice of Forum, Another Choice of Law: Consensual Adjudi-
catory Procedure in Federal Court, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 291, 369-71 (1988). As
Professor Mullinix argued,
[T]he ultimate inquiry must be whether the application of contract prin-
ciples to civil law waivers adequately balances the dangers of waiver
with the value-enhancing dimension of consent. The cases suggest that it
does not. If a waiver represents an "alternative, informal interaction
that the state encourages by its enforcement of the waiver," then it is
incumbent that "courts should strive to translate the fairness of the ple-
nary interaction into the informal setting of the abbreviated one."
Therefore, a party waiving a right should be assured the functional
equivalent of that right in the setting in which the right is foregone. As a
practical matter, it is the court's task to "determine the nature of the
right that has been waived, identify the kind of protection that the right
provides, and then require that an informal version of those same protec-
tions be provided."
Id. at 371 (quoting Edward L. Rubin, Towards a General Theory of Waiver, 28
UCLA L. REV. 478, 537 (1981)).
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whether the waiver was "knowingly and intelligently" made.209 Spe-
cifically, there should be an explicit inquiry into whether the borrower
understands the entire scope of the mortgage broker's duties as an
agent and whether the borrower understands that the dual agency re-
lationship may inure to the lender's material benefit and the bor-
rower's detriment. Absent this type of searching inquiry, the court
cannot determine whether the borrower is truly relinquishing her
right or the mortgage broker is asserting the right to be a dual agent
and by default is limiting or eliminating the borrower's right to make
an informed choice.
b. Independent Contractor
Many mortgage brokers have decided to eliminate the borrower's
fiduciary claims by determining that they are independent contrac-
tors. Independent contractors do not work under the direct control of
a principal. 2 10 Instead, the principal delegates a duty to the contrac-
tor and may define the scope of the work, but then leaves the indepen-
dent contractor to determine the specifics of performing the task. In
these situations, the principal will be found liable only if the delegated
duty is a non-delegable one.2
11
Courts usually examine several factors when deciding what type of
relationship the fiduciary has with the principal. Those factors include
looking at issues as varied as whether the principal furnishes the es-
sentials to perform the work, to the principal's ability to furnish de-
tails about the kind and character of the work, to who pays the
employees and has the right to discharge them.2 12 The policy justifi-
cations also relate to the principal's lack of control. Specifically, those
209. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. v. L. K. Comstock & Co., Inc., 488 F.Supp. 732,
737 (D.Nev. 1980) ("[W]aiver is the voluntary relinquishment of a known legal
right.").
210. See generally J. A. Jolowicz, Liability for Independent Contractors in the English
Common Law-A Suggestion, 9 STAN. L. REV. 690 (1957).
211. Nondelegale duties are those which are so dangerous that the principal must
take responsibility for them. Given that these loan products are often designed to
fail, it is a significant policy decision that all lenders, regardless of their defined
relationship status with the broker, will be held responsible. See discussion infra
at Part I.B.l.c.
212. In Kisner v. Jackson, 132 So. 90, 91 (Miss. 1931), the court looked at several fac-
tors, including:
1) Does the principal have the power to terminate the contract at will;
2) Can the principal fix the price in payment for the work, or vitally
controls the manner and time of payment;
3) Does the principal furnish the means and appliances for the work;
4) Does the principal control the premises;
5) Does the principal furnish the materials upon which the work is done
and receives the output thereof;
6) Does the independent contractor deal only with the principal concern-
ing output;
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policies presume that the fiduciary has adopted the work as her own
and must therefore prevent any risks. They also presume that the
fiduciary has charged the principal an amount commensurate with
that risk. There will be liability for the principal when she is negli-
gent in selecting the independent contractor.
2 13
When the mortgage broker is not an employee of the lender, the
lender is unable to control the broker's actions and or decisions. Also
the relationship typically is not exclusive to a single lender, which
seems to further separate the mortgage broker relationship from that
of a fiduciary. 2 14 The mortgage broker is "for hire" and receives com-
pensation from the lender for her services. The question becomes
whether the mortgage broker is merely serving as a facilitator by
bringing the borrower to the lender or as a negotiator by stepping in to
the lender's shoes to negotiate the actual loans terms.
The mortgage broker is responsible for presenting one or several
lenders' criteria for approval of a loan to the buyer. Maintaining inde-
pendent contractor status requires the broker to take care not to inter-
fere in the borrower's discretion in choosing the loan products or risk
liability. Interestingly, the lender bears some responsibility under
this theory for the broker's conduct and should not escape liability if
the lender has knowledge that the offered products are irresponsible
or abusive. 2 15 Indeed, by offering mortgage brokers predatory loan
products or failing to require the broker to certify or independently
investigate the broker's actions, the lender is in effect retaining super-
visory control over the mortgage broker with the broker acting in an
manner that the lender authorizes. Furthermore, the lender's failure
to request pertinent borrower information from the mortgage broker
that would adjust loan terms for the benefit of the borrower raises an
7) Does the principal have the right to prescribe and furnish the details
of the kind and character of work to be done;
8) Does the principal have the right to supervise and inspect the work
during the course of employment;
9) Does the principal have the right to direct the details of the manner
in which the work is to be done;
10) Does the principal have the right to employ and discharge the sub-
employees and to fix their compensation;
11) Is he obliged to pay the wages of said employees?
213. Under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 411 (1965), a principal is liable when she
"fails to take action upon noticing the careless performance of the contractor."
214. See generally Delsack, supra note 55, at 323 (criticizing the New York courts'
failure to interpret a state statute as making a mortgage broker an agent for both
the purchaser and the institutional lender).
215. Imposing such a rule would be similar to the rules imposing liability in inher-
ently dangerous tort situations. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 410
(1965); James B. McHugh, Risk Administration in the Market Place: A Reap-
praisal of the Independent Contractor Rule, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 661, 662-65 (1973).
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issue of imputed knowledge from which the lender should not be able
to escape by claiming independent contractor status.
2 16
c. The Duty of Good Faith
The duty of good faith is also used to prevent opportunistic behav-
ior. There is a contractual duty of due care and fair dealing. Implied
within every contract, the duty requires good faith in contract
performance. 2 17
A good faith duty has a similar purpose to a fiduciary duty of care
in that it establishes a standard of conduct. It is distinguishable from
a fiduciary duty in the manner in which the duty attaches and in its
remedy. 2 18 A contractual duty does not exist until the contract is cre-
ated and is not the typical vehicle for dealing with imbalance of bar-
gaining powers in contract negotiations.2 19 It is therefore more
limited in the way in which it remedies the harm-essentially
requiring a post hac determination of damages instead of deterring
misbehavior.
However, the distinction is more than a procedural one. As a sub-
stantive duty, a fiduciary duty requires a fiduciary to adhere to the
duty throughout the fiduciary's action on behalf of the principal. In
that regard, there is a continual deterrence from misbehavior. A con-
tract, because it is bargained for, usually constricts duties and obliga-
tions that the parties might ordinarily have. This is especially true in
the fiduciary context. The duty of good faith imposes no obligation on
the fiduciary to advance the principal's interests or even to act without
self-interest. 22 0 Thus, it is not proper to characterize it as a fiduciary
duty.22 1
216. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 392 (1958).
217. The duty of good faith and fair dealing is implied in every contract. E. Allan
Farnsworth, Good Faith Performance and Commercial Reasonableness Under the
Uniform Commercial Code, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 666, 669 (1963) ("[Tlhe inclusion of
an obligation of good faith performance in the Code revives an ancient, although
largely forgotten, principle.").
218. Eileen A. Scallen, Promises Broken Vs. Promises Betrayed: Metaphor, Analogy,
and the New Fiduciary Principle, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 897.
219. Blake D. Morant, The Salience of Power in the Regulation of Bargains: Procedu-
ral Unconscionability and The Importance of Context, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 925
(discussing disproportional power and procedural unconscionability's procedural
element, which lends itself to scrutiny of the imbalance of power).
220. See generally Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Duties as Default Rules, 74 OR. L. REV.
1209, 1225-26 (1995).
221. See Smith, supra note 189, at 1448 (stating that fiduciaries owe more stringent
obligations than mere contracting parties).
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2. Fiduciary Duty and Economic Risks
Fiduciary duty is a high standard for imposing liability and must
be affirmed in this context for several reasons. As discussed above,
the mortgage broker's disclosure serves as the borrower's potentially
unknowing waiver of fiduciary duty. Furthermore, the seriousness of
the financial obligation raises the issue of whether this is a waiver
that the law should so willingly allow a party to include as a standard
contact term.
The mortgage broker acts as an agent of both the lending institu-
tion and the borrower and enters into two separate contracts. 2 22 The
mortgage broker contracts with the borrower to provide a service. Not
only does the agreement authorize the mortgage broker to make appli-
cations on behalf of the borrower, it also identifies the fees that the
borrower must pay the broker.2 23 This service is particularly useful
for borrowers who have complex financial circumstances or may have
difficulty obtaining particular loans.
The mortgage broker also has a contractual obligation with the
lending institutional to gather all pertinent information from the po-
tential purchaser. The mortgage broker assumes the costly and time
consuming task of taking the mortgage application, collecting the rele-
vant financial information, preparing the credit reports, and arrang-
ing for the property appraisals. 22 4 The broker then earns a
commission from the lender for performing these tasks. In both
agency capacities, the mortgage broker absorbs the transaction costs
of the deal. However, this assumption of transaction costs operates to
achieve different results for the borrower and the lending institution.
a. Mortgage Brokers as Market Monitors
Mortgage brokers increase the availability and affordability of resi-
dential mortgages because they help make borrowers more financially
literate by explaining different loan products to them. They also make
the mortgage markets more competitive for borrowers. Mortgage bro-
kers awareness of and access to an array of lenders' loan products re-
sult in effective monitoring of lenders' rates and many products and
offerings. Their acquired expertise is unmatched by that of the aver-
age borrower.
Yet, herein lies the conflict. The justification for mortgage brokers
as market monitors posits that mortgage brokers owe a fiduciary duty
222. See discussion infra Part III.C.2.
223. See generally Peter J. Hong, Hidden Costs to Homeowners: the Prevalent Non-
disclosure of Yield Spread Premiums in Mortgage Loan Transactions, 18 Loy.
CONSUMER L. REV. 131 (2005).
224. Delsack, supra note 55, at 309.
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to the borrower and not to the lending institution. 22 5 This is a flawed
presumption that supports the vague and ambiguous definitions of the
mortgage broker's duties and responsibilities. Instead, what needs to
be done is to align the brokers' duties and responsibilities with the
economic costs of the mortgage transaction. Doing so recognizes that
the mortgage broker receives adequate compensation for the rights in-
herent in representing the borrower and that the borrower has paid
the mortgage broker to absorb the risks of the transaction and has a
legitimate expectation that both the transaction and the relationship
will have a material benefit. 2
2 6
The duty requires the agent to act in the best interests of the prin-
cipal in carrying out the assigned duties. Failure to do so requires
the agent to prove that an action or transaction in conflict with the
fiduciary duty is in the best interests of the principal.
2 27
Unfortunately, once a borrower discovers how economically disad-
vantageous the loan is, she realizes that the broker has implicitly or
explicitly given her poor advice. Upon learning that the circumstance
may be actionable, the borrower learns that the available remedies
are ineffective and costly. 228 The unstated expectation of the con-
sumer is that the mortgage broker reviews the borrower's credit file
225. See Niels B. Schaumann, The Lender as Unconventional Fiduciary, 23 SETON
HALL L. REv. 21, 26 (1992). See also Theodore H. Hellmuth, Lender Liability and
Fiduciary Obligation: Dentures for a "Toothless Lion," 3 PROB. & PROP. 20, 22
(Aug. 1989) ("The lender who acts as a fiduciary to the borrower is liable for al-
most anything; the lender who does not is liable for almost nothing. This is not
simply hyperbole. The average borrower must fend for himself or herself when
negotiating the average loan. To the contrary, when a lender who is a fiduciary
gains an advantage over the borrower, there is a presumption of unfairness").
226. See generally 1 JOHN N. POMEROY & SPENCER W. SYMONS, A TREATISE ON EQUITY
JURISPRUDENCE §§ 151, 157 (5th ed. 1941); DAN B. DOBBS, REMEDIES: DAM-
AGEs-EQuITy-RESTITUTION § 2.3 (1973).
227. See Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CAL. L. REV. 795, 797-804 (1983). The
common law duty of agency has protected borrowers in only a few situations-
and there is a recognized conflict among the states. Minnesota imposes a statu-
tory duty. See MINN. STAT. §§ 58.16(1), 58.02(3), (14), (19), (23) (2007) (mortgage
broker defined as mortgage originator). The California Supreme Court used a
statute and common law agency principles to impose a duty in Wyatt v. Union
Mortgage Co., 598 P.2d 45, 50 (Cal. 1979) (a mortgage broker's duty to borrower
was recognized under state agency law and California real estate law). A Penn-
sylvania court used common law agency principles in McGlawn v. Pennsylvania
Human Relations Comm'n, 891 A.2d 757, 769 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2006). A federal
district court in Illinois permitted the inference of a fiduciary duty between mort-
gage broker and borrower using agency law principles in Epps v. Money Store,
Inc., No. 6-C-2703, 1997 U.S. District LEXIS 17964 at *20 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 30,
1997). Finally, a bankruptcy court in Pennsylvania also imposed a fiduciary duty
protecting the borrower. In re Barker v. Altegra Credit Company, 251 B.R. 250,
259 Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2000). By contrast, a federal district court in Washington
refused to recognize a fiduciary relationship between broker and borrower. Bra-
zier v. Sec. Pac. Mortgage, 245 F. Supp. 2d 1136, 1143 (W.D. Wash. 2003).
228. See discussion infra Part II.A.2.b.iv.
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extensively and will make recommendations based on that review. In
actuality, unbeknownst to the average borrower, what the broker is
doing is much narrower. The average broker views her role as provid-
ing financing for a certain amount. Brokers will readily admit that
they have access to many products and knowledge about the market,
but they do not perceive that their duty is to provide financing that is
appropriate. 2 29 In theory and practice, there is little or no consensus
on what the broker should do. The duties range from advising the
borrower on a broad range of products given the borrower's personal
circumstances to presenting a range of options for the borrower with-
out express or implied recommendations for the borrower to make a
decision to facilitating a sale on behalf of the lender as the lender's
agent.
Given this range of services among mortgage brokers, borrowers
face substantial risks in their dealings with them. Essentially, bor-
rowers are unaware, unless the mortgage broker's duties are pre-
scribed by state law, of the nature of the broker's duties and functions.
Unless specifically discussed with them, borrowers do not know what
services they are to receive. 2 30 To the extent that borrowers place re-
liance on the mortgage brokers' expertise, the borrower implicitly ad-
mits not having the expertise to make loan comparisons. Taking away
the fiduciary duty imposes tremendous costs on the borrower-eco-
nomic as well as social. The borrower needs germane information to
assess the potentially detrimental features of the loan as well as the
knowledge base to assess whether the loan fits her financial situation.
b. Mortgage Brokers and Transaction Costs
Analyzing the structure of the mortgage broker's relationship to
the borrower leads to the conclusion that imposing fiduciary duties, in
this context, would reduce the economic costs associated with con-
ducting complex commercial transactions. 2 3 1 By indirectly supervis-
ing conduct, the imposition of fiduciary duties deters bad actors. They
differ from express contractual obligations because of the absence of a
229. Preserving the American Dream: Predatory Lending Practices and Home Foreclo-
sures, Before the S. Banking and Urban Affairs Comm., 110th Cong. 17 (2007)
(statement of Harry Dinham, President of the National Association of Mortgage
Brokers), available at http://banking.senate.govLfiles/dinham.pdf.
230. For example, borrowers may be unaware that they are entitled to sue under state
deceptive fraud statutes. See generally Glenn Kaplan & Chris Barry Smith,
Patching the Holes in the Consumer Product Safety Net: Using State Unfair Prac-
tices Laws to Make Handguns and Other Consumer Goods Safer, 17 YALE J. ON
REG. 253 (2000).
231. G. Richard Shell, Opportunism and Trust in the Negotiation of Commercial Con-
tracts: Toward a New Cause of Action, 44 VAND. L. REV. 221, 230 (1991) ("Trans-
action cost economics uses the concepts of asset specificity and the resulting
danger of opportunism to predict the form business enterprises will take.").
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bargain context and the foresight that negotiation of the best terms
requires. 2 3 2 More importantly, fiduciary duties can cover unforseen
circumstances. 2 3
3
By reducing the inherently high economic costs of direct monitor-
ing and detailed bargaining, or economizing the transaction costs as-
sociated with the relationship, the fiduciary obligation serves a
particularly useful function. Fiduciary duties serve to make the
transaction economically efficient because they serve as a check on the
fiduciary's abuse of power. It is the actual exercise of the fiduciary's
relationship that gives her a controlling influence. While the actual
scope of the fiduciary duties may seem limited, it is the potential to
use the granted duties more broadly that makes the relationship work
as a constraint on decision making. This fiduciary's function is too
critical to be relegated to whether it is bargained for or not. Whether
the bargaining power is equal or unequal, or the principal is sophisti-
cated or unsophisticated, the fiduciary has the capacity to create and
expose the principal to risks.234
Furthermore, the imposition of fiduciary duties is appropriate in
the mortgage broker context when the nature of financing the obliga-
tion is one involving structured financing.23 5 Mortgage brokers rou-
tinely recommend mortgages that are innovative, alternative forms of
financing and in that regard may be both unconventional and sophis-
ticated. 236 Although innovative mortgage products are commonly
232. See also Robert D. Cooter & Thomas S. Ulen, An Economic Case for Comparative
Negligence, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1067 (1986).
233. See Andrew S. Gold, On the Elimination of Fiduciary Duties: A Theory of Good
Faith for Unincorporated Firms, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 123, 164 (2006) (dis-
cussing waiver of fiduciary duties as providing no protection from unforseen cir-
cumstances). See also Therese H. Maynard, Spinning in a Hot IPO-breach of
Fiduciary Duty or Business as Usual? 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2023, 2062 (2002)
(discussing how fiduciary duties compel an agent to act in a fair and ethical man-
ner whenever unforseen circumstances arise).
234. Frankel, Fiduciary Law, supra note 227, at 808-09 (1983) ("A central feature of
fiduciary relations is that the fiduciary serves as a substitute for the entrustor
.... The power that the fiduciary obtains is originally vested in someone else,
and is delegated to the fiduciary not for his own use, but solely for the purpose of
facilitating the performance of his functions.").
235. Loans, including subprime loans with alternative financing features, include ad-
justable-rate mortgages, wrap-around mortgages, balloon payments, Alt-A mort-
gages, option ARMS, negative amortization, no-doc loans, no down-payment
loans, piggy-back loans and loans with high prepayment fees. Structured financ-
ing can make it difficult to re-construct obligations because mortgage tranches
are divided according to the investor's interest.
236. Taiesha L. Cantwell, Yield-Spread Premiums: Who's Working for the Borrower?
HUD's Erroneous Regulation and its Bar on Plaintiffs, 21 LAw & INEQ. 367
(2003); see also David Listokin, Elvin K. Wyly, Brian Schmitt & loan Voicu, The
Potential and Limitations of Mortgage Innovation in Fostering Homeownership in
the United States, 12 HousING POL'Y DEBATE 465 (2001) (analyzing and discuss-
ing several of these alternative forms of financing).
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found in the marketplace now, what makes them problematic is their
structured nature. Structured financing mortgages are more difficult
to understand and therefore require constructive advice from the
mortgage broker who recommends these transactions and who has ex-
pertise in the various financing schemes. 23 7 Imposition of a fiduciary
relationship between the broker and borrower would make encourage
the broker to give constructive advice.
Mortgage brokers facilitate these transactions by implicitly, if not
directly, representing to customers that the transactions are afforda-
ble. Affordability requires that under normal circumstances the long-
term obligation will net a benefit for the homeowner resulting in own-
ership of the property and receipt of the property equity. Reliance is
reasonable because the typical borrower will not have sufficient
knowledge to evaluate the risk and benefits of the transaction. 238 The
expectation is that the mortgage broker will make a complete review
of all of the pertinent information and throughly explain the transac-
tion to the borrower.
The nature of the disclosure and the full scope of the duty is con-
textual because both depend on the transaction. Nonetheless, the un-
conventional aspects of the transaction must be thoroughly explained
and should be independently evaluated for affordability. Disclosing
knowledge and material facts about the transaction requires that the
mortgage broker make an independent evaluation of the risks and
benefits of the proposed loan. Codifying this type of requirement is
consistent, therefore, with a common law action establishing a duty
because it is the expectation of the borrower that the mortgage broker
will perform more than a clerical function in processing the borrower's
loan. That expectation is a reasonable one and therefore must be con-
sidered when evaluating the parties's agreed upon contractual duties.
Significant to a breach of duty in agency law is whether the agent
has placed the interests of the principal before those of the agent. Any
rule regulating mortgage brokers must provide a bright line test that
237. Subprime Mortgage Market Turmoil: Examining the Role of Securitization: Before
the S. Subcomm. on Securities, Insurance, and Invest Securities of the S. Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs Comm., 110th Cong. 33 (2007) (statement of Christo-
pher Petersen, Assistant Professor of Law, Levin College of Law, University of
Florida), available at http://banking.senate.gov/_files/ACFE4F.pdf.
238. Support for this position is found in the Restatement (Second) of Agency, which
implies reliance by the principal on the agent and therefore requires a duty
whenever such reliance is reasonable. Section 378 provides:
One who, by a gratuitous promise or other conduct which he should real-
ize will cause another reasonably to rely upon the performance of defi-
nite acts of service by him as the other's agent, causes the other to
refrain from having such acts done by other available means is subject to
a duty to use care to perform such service or, while other means are
available, to give notice that he will not perform.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 378 (1958).
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makes clear that self-dealing and dual agency are not permitted. In a
structured financing transaction, not only is the lending arrangement
unconventional but the mortgage broker's involvement with a credit-
impaired borrower is by its very nature rehabilitative. The expected
outcome is that the mortgage broker will re-construct the typical
mortgage arrangement so that the borrower will be able to afford the
loan. The mortgage broker reforms the transaction to make that
which was unaffordable as a conventional mortgage become affordable
as a subprime mortgage. While undoubtedly providing a service in
qualifying a borrower that might otherwise not be eligible for any type
of mortgage loan, the subprime borrower also takes on additional risks
by becoming eligible for a loan. It is the act of qualifying the borrower
that creates the conflict of interest. When the mortgage broker, as an
agent of the borrower, earns a commission by qualifying the borrower,
there is a duty to inform the principal, the borrower, of all material
facts relating to the mortgage transaction.
The failure of a mortgage broker as an agent to draw the bor-
rower's attention to significant risks is problematic in another aspect
as well. When scrutinizing the transactions post hac, it is often diffi-
cult, if not impossible, to reconstruct the transaction to determine
whether the pricing of the loan has considered all relevant factors
from the borrower's perspective. 23 9 For a borrower who is presumably
financially unsophisticated and unable to fully evaluate the risks and
benefits of the proposed transaction, the unconventional, structured
finance loan, is complex. Because of the unusual attributes and com-
plexity of such a transaction, the borrower needs and deserves a great
deal of assistance. Typically the borrower will not have sufficient in-
formation to independently evaluate the risks and benefits of the pro-
posed transaction. A fiduciary duty requires full and complete
disclosure of all material aspects of the transaction with disregard to
how such disclosure might compromise the mortgage broker or agent's
financial benefit. 240 The mortgage broker's duty to exercise reasona-
ble skill and care is one of knowledge that depends on the context.
Resolution of whether the duty was met may depend on whether there
were other professionals involved or the borrower relied solely on the
mortgage broker for advice. 24 1 Highlighting the "reliance on an ex-
pert" part of the standard demonstrates that the borrower's perspec-
239. Jackson & Burlingame, supra note 58, at 348-51.
240. Robert Litan et al., The Community Reinvestment Act After Financial Moderniza-
tion: A Final Report (2001) (prepared for the Department of the Treasury), avail-
able at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/reports.finalrpt.pdf.
241. As proposed below, borrowers need a private right of action. The Real Estate
Settlement Practices Act does not provide a private right of action. The Truth in
Lending Act provides one, but it is inadequate because of its one-year state of
limitations. Fogel, supra note 57, at 440.
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tive of the breadth of the brokers' advice and knowledge is crucial.
242
A critical inquiry focuses on identifying the exact nature and extent of
the broker's services.
IV. A PARTIAL RESPONSE TO A MARKET
THAT FAILS BORROWERS
The goals of equality and justice in the subprime market are not
inimical to a free market. The consumer mortgage market has under-
gone a dramatic transformation and needs to become more uniform
and efficient in order to function well and equitably. The subprime
mortgage market is basically unregulated and is dominated by a non-
bank financial system. This transformation follows changes that have
occurred in the financial services industry but without the necessary
adjustments to the current regulatory structure.
243
A. Why a Federal Approach is Needed 24
4
The lack of uniformity in mortgage broker regulation allows mort-
gage brokers to focus narrowly on selling a product rather than pro-
viding a level of expert service for complex transactions to the
borrower. The absence of a uniform statute means the terms of the
written contract vary with each transaction. In many instances, bor-
242. Teri J. Dobbins, Losing Faith: Extracting the Implied Covenant of Good Faith
from (Some) Contracts 84 OR. L. REV. 22 (2005) (arguing that such a duty ele-
vates the implied duty of good faith to a duty of full disclosure).
243. Heidi Mandanis Schooner, Consuming Debt: Structuring the Federal Response to
Abuses in Consumer Credit, 18 Loy. CONSUMER L. REV. 43, (2005) (recommending
changes to consumer debt regulatory structure).
244. On March 31, 2008, the U.S. Treasury Department released its Blueprint for a
Modernized Financial Regulatory Structure (The Financial Modernization
Blueprint). The improvements are designed to both stabilize the market and
enhance financial innovation, while also providing greater consumer protections.
The Financial Modernization Blueprint recommendations on mortgage
origination call for consistent national standards for all types of mortgages and
consistent enforcement at the federal and state levels. The Blueprint has three
components, specifically, the report recommends:
1) the creation of a new federal commission led by a Presidential
appointee, to evaluate, rate, and report on the adequacy of each state's
system for licensing and regulating participants in the mortgage
origination process. Federal legislation should establish uniform
minimum qualifications for state mortgage market participant licensing
systems;
2) national mortgage lending laws promulgated and implemented by the
Federal Reserve; and
3) clarification and enhancement of the federal enforcement authority
over these laws.
See, Department of Treasury, The Department of the Treasury Blueprint for a
Modernized Financial Regulatory Structure, 2008, 78-82, available at http'/
www.treas.gov/press/releases/reports/Blueprint.pdf.
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rowers waive any duty that the brokers have to them, or worse yet,
depend on brokers for solid advice but are not really aware when the
advice is incomplete, misleading, or simply not there. Consequen-
tially, many borrowers are uncertain about the scope of the services
provided by the mortgage broker as well as the proportion of the com-
pensation owed to the mortgage broker. Because home ownership is
such a deeply-ingrained American value, indisputably a part of the
country's economic and social fiber, mortgage brokers who now origi-
nate at least half of all home loans should be governed by a compre-
hensive and effective federal standard that the states implement.
The current regulatory scheme is incongruent. Even with the
great many local and state statutes, regulations, and policies regulat-
ing mortgage brokers, there has not been the dramatic market effect
that underscores a resounding policy. The possibility of success for
individual litigants is not predictable and is costly. The probability of
dormant claims due to an inadequate and ineffective system of resolu-
tion underscores the need for a federal approach.
A federal law that completely preempts state law is unnecessary
for a number of reasons. First, it ignores federalism concerns and the
traditional sharing of power and authority by the state and federal
government in this particular area. Again, Justices Stevens' state-
ment that consumer law is "quintessentially an area of state regula-
tion" is rather foreboding. A uniform standard specifically affirms a
broker's fiduciary duty to the borrower. It gives borrowers an estab-
lished set of expectations and information-based points from which to
be able to assess mortgage broker violations. Uniformity in this area
also provides a borrower a private right of action in addition to the
enforcement actions that may be brought by the state government.
24 5
Moreover, it is important to understand why this needed uniformity
cannot be addressed solely through the Federal Reserve's regulatory
authority. The structured finance operations that created and con-
tinue to support this credit market have extended beyond the tradi-
tional banking system into the non-bank financial system. To rely on
the banking system's limited role as an intermediary in the subprime
mortgage credit market diminishes the effect that regulatory inter-
vention can have in stemming the current crisis. Thus, the regulatory
arm must reach wider than the Federal Reserve's limited jurisdiction
over the banking system.
245. Cf Robert M. Jaworski, Just When You Thought it Was Safe to Go in the Water:
Recent Court Decisions Regarding Yield Spread Premiums Class Certification, 11
Loy. CONSUMER L. REV. 91 (1999) (advocating need for YSP class action morato-
rium legislation).
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B. Defining Fiduciary Duty Principles for Mortgage Brokers
Whether borrowers should have contractual rights or statutorily
imposed rights raises issues of how broad the duties should be. If ne-
gotiated terms apply, a borrower is able to protect herself only if she
has equal bargaining power. Mortgage brokers have greater power
over the negotiation process because they are familiar with the specif-
ics. More likely than not, the mortgage broker would rebuff a bor-
rower's objection to a dual agency provision. Borrowers unknowingly
contract to make mortgage brokers independent contractors. Simi-
larly, borrowers may not be aware of the implied duty of good faith.
Later, a borrower is left with little recourse.
On the other hand, if fiduciary duties are created by law, the duties
do not have to be negotiated and may encompass specific obligations.
Indeed, statutorily imposed fiduciary duties can require mortgage bro-
kers to thoroughly review the borrower's financial information, com-
pare the benefits of certain mortgage products and adequately disclose
the risks of the recommended mortgage products. The exact nature
and extent of the mortgage broker's services must be identified. Be-
cause assessing care and skill is not a simple matter, it is more effi-
cient and predictable to establish a bright-line test.
2 46
The federal legislation creating a fiduciary duty for mortgage bro-
kers to protect consumers from undisclosed information and ineffec-
tive counseling should have three parts. First, the law should
incorporate some standards of industry uniformity. It should prohibit
mortgage brokers from making any loan recommendations unless they
can document the borrower's ability to repay at the indexed rate and
require written disclosures with clear and specific language explain-
ing to the borrower when and how the terms of the loan change. The
call for financial literacy, while inappropriate as a comprehensive so-
lution, can be heeded as well. To the extent that notices can be
drafted with clear and specific language explaining the product that
the borrower is agreeing to, borrowers become more knowledgeable,
better informed, and able to reject some offered products as
inappropriate. 24 7
246. To assess care and skill, not only are the representations and warranties made by
the broker important, but also the agent's level of knowledge and experience and
even level of compensation will be significant. Dana M. Muir & Cindy A. Schi-
pani, Fiduciary Constraints: Correlating Obligation with Liability, 42 WAKE FOR-
EST L. REV. 697, 705 (2007) (discussing an agent's level of expertise in context of
corporate officer and director fiduciary duty).
247. Borrower protections could possibly include: proof of income from borrowers; abil-
ity to re-pay; fiduciary duty in underwriting requirements; guarantee that prop-
erty taxes and insurance bills are covered; no prepayment penalties; and no yield
spread premiums.
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Second, the statute should require a non-waiveable legal standard.
This standard is important because borrowers are unknowingly giving
up their rights when they initially retain a broker. By calling a bor-
rower's signed statement agreement to dual agency disclosure, there
is a legitimacy attached to it. The "disclosure" is an unceremonious
waiver although it is presented as a simple contract term. Borrowers
are led to equate a retainer condition to the relinquishment of a legal
right. This is patently unfair.2 48
Third, the test of breach should be a bright line standard that eval-
uates the broker's affirmative actions and conduct towards the bor-
rower. A test of active persuasion is less onerous for mortgage
brokers, but requires borrowers to meet a more difficult standard of
proof. Thus, balancing leniency in favor of the borrower when there is
an "exotic" mortgage product in the transaction requires only a show-
ing that the borrower accepted a product that was inconsistent with
the borrower's true risk. The mortgage broker would therefore be
found liable for breach of fiduciary breach if the borrower was advised
to accept abusive loan terms based on specific statements or actions
that can be both attributed to the lender and verified. 24
9
Finally, the statute must specify when the Federal Reserve, OCC,
OTS, or FDIC, as federal baking regulators should take civil enforce-
ment action against states. The policy should be limited to those
times when a state (1) fails to take any action to implement the mort-
gage broker laws; (2) fails to take timely and appropriate action when
there is a charge of mortgage broker abuse; and (3) has a situation
that involves precedent-setting issues or issues in which federal in-
volvement is needed to ensure national consistency.
V. CONCLUSION
The sub-prime mortgage saga is the same old story.
The little guys get tough love.
The big guys get forgiveness .... 250
Undoubtedly, the market has failed many hard-working Ameri-
cans and dashed their dreams of home ownership. Many subprime
borrowers find themselves subject to even more inequality as they lose
248. The statute can also address industry uniformity by requiring Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac to have uniform underwriting standards.
249. Plaintiffs will have to allege that there was a there was an equally effective, less
financially burdensome loan product that they would qualify for. To avoid the
same problems that have arisen in litigation involving housing discrimination
regarding the defendant's burden of proof, legislation should specify the burdens
of proof to avoid confusion. See Peter E. Mahoney, The End(s) of Disparate Im-
pact: Doctrinal Reconstruction, Fair Housing and Lending Law, and the Antidis-
crimination Principle, 47 EMORY L.J. 409, 491(1998).
250. Robert B. Reich, Who Gets Bailed Out? You Guessed It, Sept. 19, 2007, http:ll
www.robertreich.org/reich/20070919.asp.
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their primary economic base. This failure is due, in part, to the trans-
formation of the residential mortgage market. Mortgage brokers,
whose participation in loan originations constitutes at least half of the
mortgage originations in this country, are a largely unregulated force
in the market. While mortgage brokers are not the sole source con-
tributing to the market's failure, they have powerful incentives to en-
gage in lending abuses. More efficaciousness in the regulation of
mortgage brokers and more defined duties regarding their relation-
ship with borrowers will provide borrowers with more protection and
reduce the occurrence of lending abuses.
The mortgage lending market is deeply flawed in another way as
well. The economic performance of subprime mortgage products has
perpetuated common myths about subprime borrowers. These myths
are effective in perpetuating greater social marginalization. The sub-
prime market has far too many reckless lenders. It operates devoid of
the needed critical assessment that allows this crisis to be manifest
not as one of credit-impaired borrowers but as a social one. Only when
the use of abusive subprime lending products is recognized as a per-
mutation of the persistent problem of unfair lending practices can the
myths be corrected and the economic performance of the subprime
market addressed equitably. This calls for the same precautions to be
applied to lenders, distributors and investors. Both failures-a mar-
ket that has failed subprime borrowers and a market failure of ineffi-
cient loans-dictate a change in legislation and policy to ensure fair
and equal access to credit. The notion of voluntary policing is neces-
sary but insufficient given the scope of the problem. While mortgage
brokers are not the only source of the subprime lending problem, their
participation in this market segment is significant. Unregulated
mortgage brokers have incentives to engage in lending abuses. A
modest intervention in the regulatory environment will protect bor-
rowers from being compromised. Borrowers can be given sufficient
protection if existing laws are expanded to require the mortgage bro-
ker to act as a fiduciary to the borrower. Moreover, the proposed
changes to the borrower-broker relationship will have a greater public
benefit because these changes will protect all borrowers.
Public policy can strike a proper balance between the access that
mortgage brokers provide to credit-impaired borrowers, mortgage sus-
tainability, and a profitable mortgage industry. The equitable concept
of fiduciary duty addresses this gap in borrower protection by placing
the obligations of disclosure on mortgage brokers, bankers and lend-
ers. By enacting this law, Congress will be taking an important step
to address legitimate concerns in a way that ensures a competitive
market while protecting consumer's economic interests.
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